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BESTAND EVEN BETTER PRACTICES IN COMMITMENT
PROCEDURESAFTER ALROSA: THE DANGERS OFABANDONING
THE “STRUGGLE FOR COMPETITION LAW”
FLORIANWAGNER-VON PAPP*
1. Introduction
Article 9 of Regulation (EC) No. 1/2003 empowers the Commission to accept
commitments offered by the undertakings after a preliminary assessment,
provided that these commitments meet the Commission’s concerns. If the
Commission accepts the commitments, it makes them binding on the
undertakings and concludes that there are “no longer grounds for action”
(the “commitment procedure”, as opposed to the “infringement procedure”
underArt. 7).1The commitment procedurewas discussed controversially from
the outset,2 and the interest has not ebbed since.3 In the Alrosa case, both the
* Lecturer in Law, University College London (UCL); Co-Director of the UCL Institute of
Global Law and the UCL Centre for Law and Economics; currently Visiting Researcher,
Harvard Law School, Cambridge, MA, USA. I would like to thankWouterWils, Natalie St Cyr
Clarke, Konstanze von Papp, and the anonymous referees for extremely helpful comments. All
internet references were active as of 2 Apr. 2012
1. This commitment procedure is part of a wider trend that promotes what one could call
“consensual competition law enforcement” or “settlement culture”, see Waelbroeck, “The
Development of a new ‘settlement culture’ in competition cases”, in Gheur and Petit (Eds.),
Alternative Enforcement Techniques in EC Competition Law (Bruylant, 2009), p. 221. For an
assessment of this trend, cf. e.g. the other contributions in that book, and those in Ehlermann
and Marquis (Eds.), European Competition LawAnnual 2008: Antitrust Settlements under EC
Competition Law (Hart Publishing, 2010); Bueren, Verständigungen – Settlements in
Kartellbußverfahren (Nomos 2011), pp. 963 et seq. Other emanations of this trend are informal
commitments – which may still be part of the mix of remedies even after the introduction of the
formal procedure –, settlements in cartel cases (Art. 10a of Regulation 773/2004),
commitments in merger cases, and – if casting the net wide – the leniency procedure in cartel
cases. These procedures raise some of the same issues as theArt. 9 commitment procedure, but
there are also significant differences (cf. Bueren, pp. 51–54). In particular, the settlement and
leniency procedures in cartel cases are much closer to the top-down infringement procedure,
and the extent of the Commission’s discretion in varying the “regular” sanction is limited, so
that many of the concerns raised against the commitment procedure are attenuated.
Commitments in merger cases, however, hand similar discretion to the Commission, and the
time constraint inmerger casesmay produce an even greater pressure on undertakings to accede
to the Commission’s “invitations to offer” particular commitments.
2. See the several contributions in Hawk (Ed.), 2005 Annual Proceedings of the Fordham
Corporate Law Institute (Juris Publishing, 2006); Temple Lang, “Commitment decisions under
Regulation 1/2003: Legal aspects of a new kind of competition decision”, 24 ECLR (2003),
Common Market Law Review 49: 929–970, 2012.
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General Court4 and the Court of Justice (ECJ)5 had the rare opportunity to
adjudicate on the degree of protection to be afforded to the undertakings
against disproportionate commitments. In contrast to the General Court, the
ECJ in Alrosa largely dispensed with the need for an enquiry into the
proportionality of commitments offered by undertakings.6
This article argues that certain features of the negotiations put into doubt
whether the bargaining process, on which the ECJ relies in lieu of a
proportionality review, can guarantee that commitments are adequate to
address competition concerns and are not disproportionate.7 The General
Court’s approach of requiring judicial review of the adequacy and
proportionality of commitments made binding seems preferable.
The main criticism against the hands-off approach of the ECJ in Alrosa is
that the severely limited judicial review of commitment decisions may result
in a vicious circle: legal uncertainty about outcomes in the infringement
347; Whish, “Commitment decisions under Article 9 of the EC Modernisation Regulation:
Some unanswered questions”, in Johansson, Wahl and Bernitz (Eds.), Liber Amicorum in
Honour of Sven Norberg – A European For All Seasons (Bruylant, 2006), p. 555; Cook,
“Commitment decisions: The law and practice under Article 9”, 29World Comp. (2006), 209;
Wils, “Settlements of EU antitrust investigations: Commitment decisions under Article 9 of
Regulation 1/2003”, 29 World Comp.(2006), 345.
3. Wils, “The use of settlements in public antitrust enforcement: Objectives and principles”,
31 World Comp. (2008), 335; Georgiev, “Contagious efficiency: The growing reliance on
US-style antitrust settlements in EU Law”, (2007) Utah L. Rev., 971; Rab, Monnoyeur and
Sukhtankar, “Commitments in EU competition cases”, 1 Journal of EuropeanCompetition Law
& Practice (2010), 171.
4. Case T-170/06, Alrosa v. Commission, [2007] ECR II-2601. For commentary following
the GC’s decision, see Temple Lang, “Commitment decisions under Regulation 1/2003”, in
Gheur and Petit, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 121; Schweitzer, “Commitment decisions underArticle
9 of Regulation 1/2003:The developing EC practice and case law”, in Ehlermann andMarquis,
op. cit. supra note 1, p. 547; Körber, “RechtlichesGehör,Verpflichtungszusagen nachArt. 9VO
1/2003 und die Alrosa-Entscheidung” in Weiß (Ed.), Die Rechtsstellung Betroffener im
modernisierten EU-Kartellverfahren (Nomos 2010), p. 73.
5. Case C-441/07 P, Commission v. Alrosa, judgment of 29 June 2010, nyr; see also the
Opinion of A.G. Kokott. For contributions following the ECJ’s judgment, see e.g. Cengiz,
“Judicial review and the rule of law in the EU competition law regime after Alrosa”, (2011)
Competition Law Journal, 127; Kellerbauer, “Playground instead of playpen: The Court of
Justice of the European Union’s Alrosa judgment on Art. 9 of Regulation 1/2003”, 32 ECLR
(2011), 1; Kellerbauer, “Weitreichender Spielraum für einvernehmliche Lösungen nach Art. 9
Verordnung (EG) Nr. 1/2003”, 21 EuZW (2010), 652; Immenga, “Zusagen, Auflagen und
Bedingungen der EU-Kommission – Herausforderungen im Beihilferecht und nach Art. 9 VO
1/2003”, in Bechtold, Jickeli and Rohe (Eds.), Recht, Ordnung und Wettbewerb – Festschrift
zum 70. Geburtstag von Wernhard Möschel (Nomos 2011), p. 293; Schweitzer,
“Verpflichtungszusagen im Gemeinschaftsrecht”, in Bechtold et al., ibid., p. 637; Mische and
Visnar, “The European Court of Justice confirms approach in De Beers commitment decision”,
(2010) Competition Policy Newsletter, 17.
6. The decisions will be discussed in section 3 of this article.
7. See infra section 4.
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procedure makes commitment decisions attractive for undertakings. The
resulting decrease in the number of infringement decisions breeds further
legal uncertainty about what the law demands. This results in an even greater
demand for commitment decisions and accordingly fewer infringement
decisions. Lacking authoritative statements of the law, undertakings look to
previous commitment decisions and non-binding guidelines to estimate the
threat points in the bargaining process. This reliance on “quasi case law”
increases the Commission’s discretion in future negotiations. The
Commission, in turn, accommodates the increased demand for commitment
decisions so as to profit from the increased discretion it enjoys, for example in
framing proactive remedies.8 The incentives for the Commission to resort to
the commitment procedure are especially strong in those cases in which the
benefit of legal certainty provided by an infringement decision would be
particularly strong, namely cases involving novel legal issues. There is a
danger that the struggle for law is abandoned in favour of discretionary
case-to-case negotiations.
There are two ways out of this vicious circle. One is to make infringement
decisionsmore attractive for the Commission by increasing the Commission’s
discretion in devising proactive remedies.9 The other way is to impose more
constraints on the Commission in the commitment procedure. Since the
legislature and the Court have largely abandoned their role in constraining
the Commission’s discretion in the commitment procedure, it now falls to the
Commission to exercise self-restraint, not only in individual cases, but by
issuing self-binding guidelines.10 In its “Best Practices” document,11 the
Commission has unfortunately missed an opportunity to do this. The
8. In the infringement procedure, the case law of the Court restricts the Commission to
imposing obligations that “restore compliance with the rules infringed”, see e.g. Joined Cases
C-241 & 242/91 P, RTE and ITP v. Commission, [1995] ECR I-743, para 93; see also Temple
Lang, op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 136–137.
9. Compare the “fencing in” relief in FTC orders, see Ducore, “Settlement of competition
conduct violations at the United States antitrust agencies and at the European Commission –
Some observations” in Hawk, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 227, 229. For the concept and limits of
“discretionary remedialism” see Lianos, “Competition law remedies: In search of a theory”, in
Lianos and Sokol (Eds.), The Global Limits of Competition Law (Stanford University Press,
forthcoming).
10. The current Hearing Officer of the European Commission, Wouter Wils, seems to
support such a self-binding announcement of self-restraint, seeWils, op. cit. supra note 2, 352,
favourably quoting the suggestion in Melamed, “Antitrust: The New Regulation”, 10 Antitrust
(1995), 13, 14–15; see also Wils’s statements infra note 17, and the criticism in Rab,
Monnoyeur and Sukhtankar, op. cit. supra note 3, 175, that the Commission’s “criteria and
rationale to accept an Article 9 commitment or proceed with an Article 7 infringement
decision . . . are not publicly known (or at least not in any great detail)”.
11. Commission Notice on Best Practices for the conduct of proceedings concerning Arts.
101 and 102 TFEU, O.J. 2011, C 308/6.
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document contains a section on the commitment procedure,12 but it largely
confines itself to restating the statutory provisions in Article 9 Regulation
1/2003 and Recital 13 of this Regulation, a brief allusion to the limited
proportionality test after Alrosa, and an overview of the sequence of
procedural steps in the commitment procedure. The Commission has not even
attempted to establish criteria for the selection of cases it considers suitable for
resolution under the commitment procedure.13 Nor does the Commission’s
recently adopted “AntitrustManual of Procedures” fill the gap:14 while it does
outline some of the policy concerns addressed in this article, it is “purely
internal guidance”.15 From a public choice perspective, it is perhaps not
surprising that the Commission did not voluntarily reduce its “playground” to
the size of a “playpen”.16 Nevertheless, it is regrettable that the Commission
has not taken its recent documents as an opportunity to establish a more
rigorous filter for cases that lend themselves to a resolution in consensual
procedures.17
This article starts by outlining the hybrid nature of commitment decisions
between the public and contract law paradigms (section 2). Section 3 describes
the Alrosa case and analyses its consequences for the judicial review of
commitment decisions. Section 4 provides an account why reliance on the
negotiations between the Commission and the undertaking to provide the right
outcome is misplaced. Section 5 explains why the ECJ’s Alrosa decision
removes practically all external constraints on the Commission’s discretion to
extract commitments that go beyond what is necessary. Section 6 outlines the
countervailing benefits of the commitment procedure. Section 7 discusses the
danger of abandoning the “struggle for law” by resorting to remedies
negotiated on a case-by-case basis. Section 8 concludes.
12. Ibid., paras. 115–133.
13. The only clarification in this regard is the statement in para 116 that the limitation in
Recital 13 Regulation 1/2003 merely excludes “secret cartels that fall under the Notice on
immunity from fines and reduction of fines in cartel cases”; this rephrases the interpretation in
MEMO/04/217 of 17 Sept. 2004 that the Recital “excludes commitment decisions in hardcore
cartel cases.”
14. Commission, Antitrust Manual of Procedures (March 2012); see Module 16, paras
5–18 (esp. paras 11, 12, 18); on proportionality, see para. 46.
15. Ibid. Notice.
16. Cf. the title of one of Kellerbauer’s articles, op. cit. supra note 5.
17. The current HearingOfficer pointed out before the need for “strict and effective internal
procedures and controls” to avoid the “risk as to the weakening of incentives for optimal case
selection and prioritization” in the commitment procedure, seeWils, op. cit. supra note 3, 348.
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2. The underlying problem:The hybrid character of commitment
decisions
The underlying problem of the commitment procedure is its hybrid character
between the “public-law paradigm” and the “contract-law paradigm”.18
2.1. The public-law paradigm
Competition law enforcement is usually a classic application of public law,
epitomized by an authoritative, unilateral top-down hierarchical command by
the “State”,19 addressed to one of its subjects and constrained by the rule of
law (the “public-law paradigm”). The commitment procedure departs from
this public-law paradigm by substituting negotiations and agreement between
the parties for the unilateral top-down command. This raises the questions
whether the rule-of-law constraint continues to apply, and if so, to what extent.
2.2. The contract-law paradigm
The reliance on “offer” and “acceptance” in the commitment procedure has
clear contractual overtones. Contract law envisages – at least as a Platonic
ideal – negotiations between parties of similar bargaining power who are able
to safeguard their own respective interests in the negotiations by relying on
their power to walk away from the negotiation table. In the area of contract law,
one largely avoids second-guessing the substantive “correctness” of the
content of the contract agreed by the parties. Given the parallels of the
commitment procedure and contracts, one may be tempted to apply the same
reasoning to commitment decisions: the agreement of both the Commission
and the undertakings appear to be a sufficient guarantee for safeguarding the
interests on both sides.20
18. The commitment procedure shares the hybrid character with all procedures that allow
the substitution of contractual solutions for a hierarchical authoritative top-down command.
The resulting problems have been debated at least since the 19th century, when the German
literature started to discuss controversially the question whether the administration should be
allowed to enter into “administrative contracts”.The standard reference is toMayer, “Zur Lehre
vom öffentlichrechtlichen Vertrage”, 3 AöR (1888), 3.
19. I have no intention of embarking on a discussion of the “State” status of the EU.
Regardless of one’s view of the EU’s status, the powers in the area of competition law are
emanations of State power, in whatever way it is delegated to the Union institutions.
20. In the Alrosa case, theAG’s Opinion reflects this approach most clearly; see Opinion of
A.G. Kokott in Alrosa, cited supra note 5, para 55. For an in-depth discussion of the “shadow of
trial model” see Bueren, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 133 et seq. For reasons why the analogy
between contractual and commitment negotiations is limited, see infra para 4 of this article, and
Bueren, ibid., pp. 137 et seq.
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3. TheAlrosa case
The Alrosa case has been discussed for several years now. The following
section recalls the salient facts and outcomes, and analyses the consequences
of the ECJ’s judgment.21
3.1. The facts
De Beers is a vertically integrated company covering the entire supply chain
for diamonds, from exploration and mining down to jewellery shops; it is
number one in the world market for the production and supply of rough
diamonds. Alrosa is also a vertically integrated company, active in the same
markets, and is number two in the world market for the production and supply
of rough diamonds. Alrosa is mainly active in Russia and the Community of
Independent States (CIS). It exported rough diamonds worth equal to, or less
than, US$ 800 million a year to areas outside the CIS. After the Commission
found out about trade arrangements between De Beers andAlrosa in a merger
investigation,22 De Beers and Alrosa notified to the Commission in 2002 an
agreement according to which Alrosa would sell and De Beers would buy
rough diamonds to the value of US$ 800 million per year for five years, with
an option for Alrosa to reduce the amount to US$700 million during the last
two years of the agreement.23 In 2003, the Commission sent two Statements of
Objections (SO) under similar case numbers (COMP/E-3/38.381 and
COMP/E-2/38.381). The former SO was addressed to both Alrosa and De
Beers and raised concerns about collusion underArticle 101TFEU.The latter
SO was addressed to De Beers only, raising concerns about an abuse of a
dominant position under Article 102 TFEU. Alrosa and De Beers offered
“Joint Commitments” in the Article 101 TFEU proceedings, gradually
lowering the amount of rough diamonds sold by Alrosa to De Beers from
US$700million toUS$275million by 2010.24These Joint Commitmentswere
21. I will limit the description to the “proportionality issue”, andwill leave out the relatively
case-specific issues concerning the status of Alrosa as an interested third party or as an
undertaking concerned and the associated procedural rights. For a fuller account of the Alrosa
decision, see Mische and Visnar, Kellerbauer, and Schweitzer (all op. cit. supra note 5).
22. See Commission Decision of 22 Feb. 2006, Case COMP/B-2/38.381 – De Beers, para
10 (notice in O.J. 2006, L 205/24).
23. The transaction was notified under the notification system of Regulation (EEC) no.
17/1962 that was then still in force, and sought either a negative clearance or an individual
exemption.
24. Alrosa had initially offered individual commitments, inter alia, to stop selling to De
Beers as of 2013, but later withdrew these commitments because they were not viable from a
business perspective. While the Commission tried before the GC to rely on this argument to
show that De Beer’s commitment to terminate purchases fromAlrosa was not disproportionate
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market-tested by the Commission.When third parties expressed concerns, the
Commission invited De Beers and Alrosa to offer revised commitments
gradually phasing out the sales and stopping them entirely from 2009
onwards. De Beers complied with this request and submitted the “De Beers
Individual Commitments”. Alrosa did not. The Commission rendered the
Individual Commitments binding on De Beers in the Article 102 TFEU
proceedings and brought these proceedings to an end.25 In substance, the
commitment by De Beers to stop purchases from 2009 onwards undeniably
affected Alrosa directly: Alrosa found itself deprived of a purchaser, despite
not having consented to theDeBeers Individual Commitments. From a formal
point of view, however, the Commission could content itself with acceptingDe
Beers’ commitments in theArticle 102 TFEU procedure, becauseAlrosa was
not – at least not formally – an “undertaking concerned” in these proceedings
at all.Alrosa brought an action for the annulment of the commitment decision.
3.2. The judgment of the General Court
The General Court emphasized the hierarchical public-law aspect of
commitment decisions from the very first paragraph of its own findings on the
substance of the case,26 and played down the contractual aspect.27 In
consequence, it held that the principle of proportionality did not only apply to
commitment procedures, but applied with nearly the same force as in
infringement procedures. The only concession the Court was willing to make
to commitment procedures was that the point of comparison for the
in relation to Alrosa, the GC rejected this argument (Alrosa v. Commission, cited supra note 4,
para 143) and the withdrawn individual commitment did not play a role in the further
proceedings.
25. Commission Decision of 22 Feb. 2006, cited supra note 22. The Art. 101 TFEU
proceedings were closed, see ibid. in fn. 6.
26. Alrosa v. Commission, cited supra note 4, para 86: “Since offers made by undertakings
are themselves without binding legal effect, it is the decision of the Commission taken under
Article 9 of Regulation No 1/2003, and that decision alone, which has legal consequences for
the undertakings.” Similarly, in para 87: The decision “cannot be considered as being a mere
acceptance on the Commission’s part of a proposal that has been freely put forward by a
negotiating partner, but constitutes a binding measure which puts an end to an infringement or
a potential infringement . . . ”.
27. Ibid., para 105: “the voluntary nature of the commitments also does not relieve the
Commission of the need to comply with the principle of proportionality, because it is the
Commission’s decision which makes those commitments binding.”; para 143: “the fact that an
undertaking has offered commitments at a particular time, for reasons of its own, does not mean
that those commitments can be assumed to be proportionate and does not relieve the
Commission of the obligation to verify their adequacy and their necessity as regards the aim
which it is sought to achieve” (this later statement was made in the context of Alrosa’s
individual commitments that had been withdrawn, see supra note 24).
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proportionality test was the “preliminary assessment” of the infringement,
rather than a finding of an actual infringement.28 In deciding on the level of
judicial review of the Commission’s assessment, the Court held that it could
review the necessity and proportionality of the commitments in full, rather
than limit its review to manifest errors, unless the commitment decision
actually contains, in any particular case, a complex economic assessment.29 In
any case it concluded that the Commission’s assessment that the De Beers
Individual Commitments were necessary – in particular the commitment to
terminate all purchases from Alrosa indefinitely – was manifestly
erroneous.30 First, because a less onerous means would have been to prohibit
De Beers from reserving to itself all or a material part of Alrosa’s diamonds
sold outside the CIS; secondly, because the Commission failed to provide
adequate reasoning why the less onerous “Joint Commitments” had been
rejected as being inadequate to address the competitive concerns; and thirdly,
because even if the Joint Commitments were indeed inadequate, the
Commission should have accepted the Individual Commitments only to the
extent that they were necessary.31
3.3. The Opinion of Advocate General Kokott
In contrast to the General Court, Advocate General Kokott emphasized the
“voluntary” or contractual aspect of commitment decisions.32 In
consequence, she concluded that “necessity may be presumed as a matter of
course in relation to the interests of the undertaking which has offered the
commitments . . . ”.33
3.4. The judgment of the ECJ
The ECJ followed the Advocate General in distinguishing between the
application of the principle of proportionality in the infringement procedure
and in the commitment procedure, based on the “specific characteristics” of
these procedures,34 and their “different objectives”.35TheCourt is less explicit
28. Ibid., paras. 99, 113.
29. Ibid., paras. 108–110, 123–125.
30. Ibid., paras. 126, 154–157.
31. Ibid., respectively: paras. 127–128; paras. 129–136; paras. 137–153 (in particular para
139).
32. Cf. Opinion of AG Kokott in Alrosa, cited supra note 5, paras. 51, 55.
33. Ibid., para 55 (distinguishing the assessment of the necessity in relation to third parties
that had not agreed, so that “the voluntary nature of the commitments . . . cannot be any
guarantee that their interests will be safeguarded”).
34. Alrosa, cited supra note 5, para 38.
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than the Advocate General that the “specific characteristic” of the
commitment procedure lies in the voluntary agreement, but this seems
nevertheless implicit in its reasoning.36 While the Court conceded the –
undisputed – point that the principle of proportionality applied as a general
principle of Union law in the commitment procedure,37 it held that the “extent
and content” of this principle were modified in comparison to the
infringement procedure.38 More specifically, the ECJ held that the only
content of the proportionality principle in the commitment procedure is that
the Commission must ensure that the set of commitments it makes binding on
the undertakings is not more onerous than any other set of commitments
offered that still meet the concerns expressed by the Commission in the
preliminary assessment.39 It rejected the General Court’s reasoning that
the Commission was required to assess whether it was sufficient to make the
offered commitments partially binding. Moreover, the ECJ rejected the
General Court’s assessment that the “manifest error” standard of judicial
review did not apply.
3.5. The consequences of the Alrosa decision I: An invitation to engage in
salami tactics?
The ECJ’s judgment in Alrosa is rightly interpreted as having completely
emasculated the proportionality review of commitment decisions.40
From a purely theoretical point of view, this interpretation is not the
inevitable result of the Alrosa judgment. The judgment requires the
Commission to choose the least restrictive of the commitments that
are actually offered by the undertakings, provided they are adequate to meet
the concerns. The parties may therefore have the possibility of resorting to
“salami tactics” by presenting the Commission with a selection of alternative
incremental commitments. Instead of presenting the Commission withmerely
two sets of commitments – the choice between the Joint Commitments
35. Ibid., para 46.
36. Cf. ibid., para 48: “Undertakingswhich offer commitments . . . consciously accept that
the concessions . . . may go beyond what the Commission could itself impose on them . . . ”
(emphasis added).
37. Ibid., para 36.
38. Ibid., para 38.
39. Ibid., para 41; also cf. para 61. The Commission’s Antitrust Manual of Procedures
(supra note 14) now adopts this test, Module 16 para 46.
40. Cf. Cengiz, op. cit. supra note 5, 150–152 and passim; in essence also Kellerbauer
(2011), op. cit. supra note 5, 8; Kellerbauer, (2010), op. cit. supra note 5, 658. See also the
assessment in Klees, “Das Instrument der Zusagenentscheidung der Kommission und der Fall
‘E.ON’ – Ein (weiterer) Sündenfall”, 59 WuW (2009), 374, 378–380, preceding the ECJ’s
judgment.
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offering a reduction of sales to US$275m from 2010 onwards, or the De Beers
Individual Commitments, offering the cessation of all sales from 2009 –, the
parties could have presented numerous alternative commitments to the
Commission with intermediate levels of sales. Even under the ECJ’s
judgment, the Commission has to choose a less restrictive alternative where it
is offered to it – always provided it chooses the commitment procedure at all –,
as long as these commitments still meet the Commission’s concerns. If the
commitments offered seamlessly cover the entire spectrum of adequate
remedies, the salami tactic would force the Commission to engage in a
proportionality analysis that is equivalent to that demanded by the General
Court.
The salami tactic does seem contrived, and there are four reasonswhy itmay
not work, two of which are legal and two of which are practical. The first legal
caveat is that its implementation presupposes that the addressee – who
“voluntarily” offered the commitments – is able to appeal a commitment
decision not only for procedural reasons, a proposition that is very
controversial.41 Secondly, even if one does allow the addressee to appeal, it is
possible that the proportionality review would be even more hands-off than in
the Alrosa case; after all, the addressee had itself offered the commitments,
while in Alrosa the appellant had not consented to the commitments.42 The
Advocate General’s Opinion seems to indicate implicitly that the undertaking
offering the commitments could not complain at all if the Commission makes
any of these commitments binding.43 This would render the salami tactic not
only futile but even dangerous, because offering an increased range of
41. Klees, Europäisches Kartellverfahrensrecht (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2005), pp.
182–183 argues for the addressees’ ability to appeal; Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, 221–223, and
Temple Lang, op. cit. infra note 74, p. 296, argue against their ability to appeal (unless there
were procedural errors). Von Rosenberg, “Unbundling through the back door . . . the case of
network divestiture as a remedy in the energy sector”, 30 ECLR (2009), 237, 250–251, and
Körber, op. cit. supra note 4 , pp. 87, 89–90, sensibly took the GC’s emphasis on the
authoritative aspect of commitment decisions inAlrosa as a sign that an addresseewould be able
to appeal the decision and that the addressee could raise the disproportionality of a commitment
despite the fact that it voluntarily agreed to it.After the ECJ’s judgment, which emphasized the
consensual aspect over the unilateral aspect, this line of reasoning is no longer available. Also
cf. the discussion in Rab, Monnoyeur and Sukhtankar, op. cit. supra note 3, 180–181, 184.
42. The question whether different standards would apply was already raised after the GC’s
judgment byTemple Lang, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 134; see also von Rosenberg’s interpretation
of the GC’s decision, op. cit. supra note 41.
43. Opinion in Alrosa, cited supra note 5, para 55: “Whilst necessity may be presumed as a
matter of course in relation to the interests of the undertaking which has offered the
commitments (in this case De Beers), . . . such a presumption cannot be made where the
interests of third parties (in this case Alrosa) are affected. The commitments do not originate
from them, which means that the voluntary nature of the commitments offered cannot be any
guarantee that their interests will be safeguarded.” Under this approach, the remaining
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alternative commitments would enlarge the Commission’s decision space
instead of restricting it.The ECJ’s judgment, however, does notmake the same
distinction as the Advocate General.44 Unless the ECJ’s statements are not
meant to apply as generally as they are stated, the salami tactic appears to be
available to the parties.
The first practical caveat is that addressees are unlikely to challenge a
commitment decision to which they agreed.A successful challengewould risk
an infringement procedure, so that the reasons that made the addressees offer
commitments in the first place argue against challenging the commitment
decision as well.45
The second practical caveat is that the Commission, instead of making a
choice between, for example, 275 million proposals of sales between Alrosa
and De Beers in US$1-increments, may decide that it would rather pursue the
infringement procedure. Nevertheless, it seems that the ECJ’s judgment is an
invitation to undertakings to engage in “salami tactics”, even though perhaps
not as extreme as the one described here. It is doubtful that anything is to be
gained by prompting the parties to engage in such tactics, instead of taking the
view of the General Court that the Commission should assess, as less
restrictive means, the possibility of making offered commitments “partially”
binding.46 Concededly, placing the burden of selecting the increments in
which commitments are offered on the undertakings ensures that the
Commission is at least presented with a pre-filtered selection of reasonable
alternatives. On the other hand, placing the burden on the undertaking seems
to be little more than a trap for the unwary, and does not allow third parties,
who cannot propose commitments and therefore cannot employ the salami
tactic, to ensure that the commitments are proportionate to the infringement.
applicability of a proportionality review initiated by the undertaking that had offered the
commitments turns on the strength of the “presumption”, on which theAG had no need to, and
did not, elaborate.
44. In para 41 of its judgment in Alrosa, cited supra note 5, the ECJ merely states
“Application of the principle of proportionality by the Commission in the context ofArticle 9 of
Regulation No 1/2003 is confined to verifying that the commitments in question address the
concerns it expressed to the undertakings concerned and that they have not offered less onerous
commitments that also address those concerns adequately.When carrying out that assessment,
the Commission must, however, take into consideration the interests of third parties.”
45. The only difference to the initial position would be that the appellant would have
antagonized the Commission in the process. The low de facto probability of challenges by the
addressee has been noted before, e.g.,Whish, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 570; Körber, op. cit. supra
note 4, p. 90.
46. See Alrosa v. Commission, cited supra note 4, para 139, and earlier de Bronett,
Kommentar zum europäischen Kartellverfahrensrecht (Luchterhand, 2005)Art. 9 para 5. Even
if one requires the Commission to consider making commitments only partially binding, one
could still grant the Commission a wide margin of discretion in assessing the adequacy of the
commitments offered.
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This last point has a significance of its own. The proportionality review in
Alrosa was reduced to choosing between the two commitments actually
offered to the Commission. That there were two sets of commitments to begin
with was due to the purely fortuitous fact thatAlrosa had been an undertaking
concerned in a separate proceeding. Usually, a third party will not have any
opportunity to submit alternative commitments. Where the Commission is
faced with only one offer of commitments, the residual proportionality review
under the ECJ’s Alrosa judgment is completely eliminated.47 This is not
compatible with theAdvocate General’s sensible concession that third parties
have a right to separate protection, because “the voluntary nature of the
commitments . . . cannot guarantee that their interests will be safeguarded”
and that therefore “it is always necessary to examine . . . whether the
commitments go beyond what is necessary in order to address the competition
problems in question.”48
3.6. Consequences of Alrosa II: An increase in commitment decisions?
The General Court’s Alrosa judgment was predicted to make the commitment
procedure substantially less attractive for the Commission in the future.49 The
Advocate General’s Opinion, and the judgment of the ECJ, however,
completely reversed the position (unless one accepts and adopts the
salami-counterstrategy) and fully vindicated the Commission’s previous
practice.Accordingly, it could be expected that the prevalence of commitment
decisions would remain at least at the pre-Alrosa level, and perhaps even
increase because the pre-Alrosa uncertainty as to the standard of judicial
review has now been eliminated. Empirically, it is impossible to verify
whether the Alrosa saga had the effects on the prevalence theoretically
conjectured. There is no clear trend that the Commission reduced the rate of
commitment decisions in the time following the General Court’s judgment, or
that it increased the use after the Advocate General’s Opinion or after the
47. Cf. Alrosa, cited supra note 5, para 41. While the Commission “must . . . take into
consideration the interests of third parties”, it only has to do so “[w]hen carrying out that
assessment”, i.e. the verification “that the commitments . . . address the concerns” and “that
they [the undertakings concerned] have not offered less onerous commitments”. Third parties
can therefore challenge commitments on the basis that they do not address the concerns, even
though such a challenge will usually fail given the wide margin of discretion in setting its
priorities on the Commission’s part ; seeWils, “Discretion and prioritisation in public antitrust
enforcement, in particular EU antitrust enforcement”, 34 World Comp. (2011), 355, 359–361
and more specifically 363–364. Apparently, however, third parties are prevented from
challenging the commitments as disproportionate, unless for some external reason there were
several commitments before the Commission.
48. Opinion of AG Kokott in Alrosa, cited supra note 5, para 55.
49. Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 138–139.
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ECJ’s judgment.50 Nor can one find the conjectured trend by looking at the
ratio between Article 7 (excluding hardcore cartel cases) and Article 9
decisions.51 In any case, the overall number of commitment decisions issued is
much too small to detect statistically significant effects, and variation of the
rate of commitment decisions per year may be entirely due to chance
fluctuations. Even if one had more data, one would have to account for time
lags and the backlog of cases from the time before Regulation 1/2003.52
The CISAC case may be – but again need not be – an indication that the
General Court’s judgment in Alrosa shifted the relative attractiveness of
commitment decisions and infringement decisions in favour of the latter. In
the CISAC case, the Commission had market tested commitments shortly
before the General Court’s judgment in Alrosa was handed down. After the
General Court handed down its judgment, and before theAdvocate General’s
Opinion, the Commission issued an infringement decision in CISAC.53 This
timelinewould be consistent with an explanation based on the reduced relative
attractiveness of commitment decisions following the General Court’s
judgment; and the Commission’s alternative explanation for the change of
heart – that the market test had revealed doubts as to the effectiveness of the
commitments offered – does not rule out that further negotiations could have
50. In the period between entry into force of Regulation 1/2003 and the GC’s Alrosa
decision, the Commission adopted about 2 commitment decisions p.a.; after the GC’s decision,
this rate increased to 4 p.a.; in the short period between the AG’s Opinion and the ECJ’s
judgment, this further increased to 9 p.a.; but since the ECJ’s judgment, the rate reverted to 3
p.a.. If one disregards theA.G.’s Opinion, the development is from 2 commitment decisions p.a.
before the GC’s judgment to about 6 decisions p.a. between the GC’s and ECJ’s judgments, and
back to 3 decisions p.a. after the ECJ’s judgment. For the decisions taken into account in the
relevant periods, see infra notes 55–58.
51. Before the GC’s decision, the ratio of Art. 9 to Art. 7 decisions was 3:4. This ratio
increased sharply – and counterintuitively – to 12:5 in the period between the GC’s and ECJ’s
judgments, and increased slightly after the ECJ judgment, viz. to 5:2, as would be expected. I
am indebted to Wouter Wils for suggesting an enquiry into this aspect. There are several
difficulties with this approach, however. First, the date of issuing an infringement decision is
arguably more inert to turning points: if after a judgment commitment decisions become
relatively more attractive, the Commission is still likely to issue an infringement decision in
those cases inwhich it has already fully investigated all the relevant facts; and if after the turning
point infringement decisions become more attractive, the Commission will need time to
investigate all the facts. Second, the coding of the non-hardcore Art. 7 decisions may be
controversial. I have included all Art. 102 TFEU decisions (COMP/37.990, 38.096, 38.113,
38.784, 39.525) and the following Art. 101 TFEU- or Arts. 101/102 TFEU-decisions:
COMP/34.579, 36.632 (counted with 37.275 and 36.820 as one decision), 37.507, 37.860,
37.980, 38.606, 38.698, 38.662, and – possibly controversially, because of their proximity to
cartels – 38.549 and 39.510.
52. Cf. Whish, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 564.
53. Commission Decision of 16 July 2008, Case COMP/C2/38.698 – CISAC (summary
published in O.J. 2008, C 323/12; appeal pending, Case T-442/08, CISAC v. Commission).
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led to amended offers of commitments.54 But of course, the post hoc, ergo
propter hoc argument for causation may be as fallacious here as in other
contexts.
3.7. Consequences of Alrosa III: The ups and downs of discussing
proportionality
One effect the General Court’s judgment in Alrosa clearly did have on
commitment decisions is that the Commission started to discuss the
proportionality of the commitments. In commitment decisions preceding the
General Court’s judgment, the decisions outlined the practices raising
concerns, described the commitments offered and the comments received
during themarket test – as well as, where applicable, whatmodifications to the
commitments were agreed on following the market test –, and then stated that
(rather than discussed why) the commitments were sufficient to meet the
concerns. There was no discussion whether the commitments were necessary
and proportionate.55 Shortly after the General Court’s judgment, commitment
decisions started to include a section discussing the proportionality of the
commitments.56 After theAdvocate General’s Opinion57 and the judgment of
the ECJ,58 the Commission continued with this practice. After the Advocate
54. Cf. ibid., paras. 70–72; but see Memo/08/511, stating that the Commission had
exhausted all possibilities for an amicable solution.
55. Cf. Commission Decisions of 19 Jan. 2005, Case COMP/C-2/37.214, Joint selling of
media rights to the German Bundesliga; 22 June 2005, Case COMP/A.39.116/B2, Coca Cola;
22 Feb. 2006, Case COMP/B-2/38.381, De Beers; 22 Mar. 2006, Case COMP/C-2/38.173,
Joint selling of media rights to the FA Premier League; Case COMP/B-1/38.348,Repsol C.P.P.;
4 Oct. 2006, Case COMP/C2/38.681, The Cannes Extension Agreement.
56. See Commission Decisions of 11 Oct. 2007, Case COMP/B-1/37966,Distrigaz, paras.
34–41; 26 Nov. 2008, Cases COMP/39.388, German Electricity Wholesale Market and
COMP/39.389, German Electricity Balancing Market, paras. 77–89; 18 Mar. 2009, Case
COMP/39.402, RWEGas Foreclosure, paras. 46–53. But see Commission Decision of 13 Sept.
2007, Case COMP/E-2/39.140,DaimlerChrysler, which did not (yet) contain a proportionality
section.
57. Commission Decisions of 14 Oct. 2009, Case 39416, Ship Classification, paras. 34–42;
3 Dec. 2009, Case COMP/39.316, Gaz de France, paras. 63–88; 9 Dec. 2009, Case
COMP/38.636, Rambus, paras. 70–75; 16 Dec. 2009, Case COMP/C-3/39.530, Microsoft
(tying), paras. 96–112; 17 Mar. 2010, Case COMP/39.386, Long-term contracts France, paras.
67–102; 14Apr. 2010, Case 39351, Swedish Interconnectors, paras. 76–97; 4 May 2010, Case
COMP/39.317, E.ON Gas, paras. 61–72.
58. Commission Decisions of 29 Sept. 2010, Case COMP/39.315, ENI, paras. 85–114; 8
Dec. 2010, Case COMP/39.398, Visa MIF, paras. 54–69; 15 Nov. 2011, Case COMP/39.592,
Standard & Poor’s (S&P), paras. 78–80; 13 Dec. 2011, Case COMP/C-3/39.692, IBM
Maintenance Services, paras. 77–81. The decision of 14 July 2010, Case COMP/39.596,
BA/AA/IB, adopted shortly after the ECJ’s judgment, did not contain a section entitled
“proportionality” of the commitments, but discussed these aspects in the general discussion of
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General’s Opinion, and even before the judgment of the ECJ was handed
down, the Commission started to stress the voluntary nature of the
commitments as a factor in assessing the proportionality.59 After the ECJ’s
judgment, the Commission understandably started to include a paragraph
explaining the limited extent and content of the proportionality principle in the
commitment procedure.60 While the three decisions immediately following
the ECJ’s judgment in 2010 still devoted a relatively substantial section on the
proportionality analysis, the two commitment decisions rendered in 2011
confine themselves to outlining the applicable standard and laconically stating
that this standard has been met. If this practice continues, the ECJ’s de facto
elimination of judicial review of the proportionality of commitments has had
– even though with some delay – the predictable effect of reducing the
diligencewithwhich the Commission discusses, and arguably deliberates, this
proportionality.
4. The limits of the ECJ’s contractual interpretation of
commitment decisions
TheECJ inAlrosa has optedwhole-heartedly for the contractual interpretation
of commitment decision. This section will analyse whether such reliance on
the constraints of the negotiation process between the parties is warranted.
4.1. The “unequal bargaining strength” argument refined
Various commentators have rejected the contractual interpretation of
commitment decisions applied by the ECJwith the argument that the powerful
Commission and the undertakings do not have “equal bargaining power”.61
And yet, in the area of contract law, we usually do not accept “unequal
bargaining power” as a defence to a contractual obligation. The following
section will analyse in more detail what distinguishes contracts between
private parties – even where one of them is more powerful than the other –
from the commitment procedure.
the various commitments, and included the usual content of the proportionality section in the
conclusion (paras. 228–238); see also the decision rejectingVirginAtlantic’s complaint in this
case (Decision of 20 June 2011, C(2011) 4505 final, paras. 112 et seq.).
59. Ship Classification, para 34; Gaz de France, para 64; Rambus, para 70; Microsoft
(tying), para 96 (with footnote 48; see also para 108 with footnote 49); Long-term contracts
France, para 68; Swedish Interconnectors, para 78; E.ONGas, para 62 (all cited supra note 57).
60. ENI, para 86; Visa MIF, para 54; BA/AA/IB, para 228; S&P, para 78; IBMMaintenance
Services, para 77 (all cited supra note 58).
61. See infra note 68.
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It has often been noted that consensual competition law enforcement departs
from the contract-law paradigm by substituting, for one of the parties of
similar bargaining power, a bodywith the power to impose severe sanctions on
the other party if the bargaining process should fail.62 The standard argument
is that the Commission’s power to impose remedies of an uncertain
magnitude, coupled with the risk aversion of the undertakings, allows the
Commission to extract disproportionate commitments from the undertakings.
This standard account without more is not entirely persuasive, but there are
indeed special circumstances that distinguish commitment decisions from
private contracting.
First, as always when facing “unequal bargaining power” arguments, one
must avoid the temptation of equating power in the abstractwith power in the
negotiations. Of course the Commission has immense power, even compared
to that of large undertakings.Yet, this is not relevant in itself.Walmart also has
immense power when compared to the power of private shoppers, but we
usually do not hesitate to enforce contracts between Walmart and these
individuals. In the “negotiation” of contracts, bothWalmart and the individual
purchaser have the same power to walk away from the deal if the terms offered
by one party are not acceptable to the other. And mutatis mutandis, the
undertakings have power equal to that of the Commission in whether or not to
offer commitments, even when prompted by the Commission to do so.
Of course, this over-simplistic argument – that abstract power of one party
makes contracting with the weaker party inherently suspicious – is rarely
made with regard to the commitment procedure, at least not explicitly.Amore
refined version is to point to the uncertainty on part of the undertakings as to
what the sanctions in an infringement decision and the associated costs of a
protracted investigation might be, and to argue that “risk averse” undertakings
will therefore prefer to offer disproportionately far-reaching commitments.63
The first premise of the argument can be easily accepted, namely that there is
uncertainty as to the sanction in an infringement procedure because the
Commission has substantial discretion in devising “brave punishments”64 –
including “any behavioural or structural remedy” and, when the requirements
of Article 23 Regulation 1/2003 are met, fines.65 The uncertainty is
62. See e.g. Waelbroeck, op. cit. note 1, p. 22; Körber, op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 81–82, 85,
86.
63. See e.g., Wils, op. cit. supra note 2, 352; Cengiz, op. cit. supra note 5, 136; Bruzzone
and Boccaccio, “Taking Care of Modernisation After the Start-up: A View from a Member
State”, 31 World Comp.(2008) 89, 99; similarly, Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 646.
64. Shakespeare,Much Ado about Nothing, Act V, Scene IV.
65. While Recital 13 to Regulation 1/2003 states that the commitment procedure is not to be
used where “the Commission intends to impose a fine”, it is widely accepted that it is
permissible for the Commission to impose fines in an infringement decision following the
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particularly great in the negotiations in the commitment procedure, because
these often take place at a preliminary stage. The second premise, namely that
“the undertakings” are risk averse, may be slightly more controversial,
because undertakings are usually modelled to be risk neutral; but the
assumption may nevertheless be a reasonable one, because the undertakings
are represented by agents that may well be risk-averse.66
Yet, even if we accept both premises, the conclusion that the Commission
can extract disproportionate commitments does not follow. The risk-averse
party may well pay “an extra price”. Does this “extra price” make the
commitments disproportionate? The commitments offered are presumably at
most equal in value to (1) the expected value of the remedies imposed in an
infringement decision – if necessary, discounted to net present value –, plus
(2) the avoided expected discounted costs associated with the further
investigations (and possibly litigation), this sum being multiplied by (3) the
risk aversion factor that reflects the actor’s preference for the certain outcome
breakdown of commitment negotiations, provided the elements of Art. 23 Regulation 1/2003
are present. See e.g. the ECJ’s judgment in Alrosa, cited supra note 5, para 48; Kellerbauer
(2010), op. cit. supra note 5, 654, fn. 17. Gippini-Fournier, “The modernisation of European
competition law: First experiences with Regulation 1/2003”, Community Report to the FIDE
Congress 2008, available at <ssrn.com/abstract=1139776>, argues that “if a fine were
completely excluded, there would be little incentive for the undertakings concerned to offer
commitments” (an argument that understates the costs of remedies under Art. 7 Regulation
1/2003 as an incentive). Possibly the limitation in Recital 13 was meant to “prevent . . . the
scenario in which an undertaking is led to propose commitments under the threat of a fine”
(Bruzzone and Boccaccio, op. cit. supra note 63). If so, then the interpretation of Recital 13 that
restricts its role to excluding secret cartel cases from the commitment procedure (supra note 13)
eliminates the intended constraint for all other cases. Kellerbauer (2011), op. cit. supra note 5,
2, fn. 22, rightly points out that the Recital could have been given the meaning “that
commitment decisions should not be adopted where the gravity of the infringement requires a
fine”, in which case the constraint would have had much wider application. See Schweitzer, op.
cit. supra note 5, pp. 637–638 (the commitment procedure has been used inmany cases inwhich
a high fine could have been imposed, pointing to the cases RWE and E.ON); also cf. the
assessment by Von Rosenberg, op. cit supra note 41, 238, that RWE and E.ON faced “fines
which could have amounted to billions of Euros” before the commitments were agreed (but see
ibid. 247, negating that fines would have been imposed in these cases; the relationship between
these two statements is not clear to me).
66. The risk aversion of several agents may play a cumulative role here: managers may be
risk averse because their human capital is not diversifiable. These managers may be advised by
in-house counsel, whomay be risk averse for the same reason. Independent lawyersmay act like
risk averse agents because clients may tend to attribute success to their own actions and the
strength of their case, but to attribute failure to the lawyers’ efforts (such a tendency could be
suggested by research on the so-called “self-serving bias”). For the lawyer who is looking for
future business from the client this means that the payoff structure induces apparently
risk-averse behaviour, where losses are weighted more heavily than gains. It is possible that
“regret avoidance” also plays a role, cf. Guthrie, “Better settle than sorry: The regret aversion
theory of litigation behavior”, (1999) Univ. of Illinois L.Rev., 43.
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in the commitment procedure as compared to the variance of sanctions
possible in an infringement decision.
Those who argue that the Commission can therefore extract
disproportionate commitments implicitly compare the “infringement
sanctions” with the commitments including the risk aversion factor and
the added investigation/litigation costs. But this assumes the wrong
counterfactual: it assumes that as an alternative to the (more onerous)
commitments the undertakings would have borne only the costs of the
sanctions imposed in the infringement decision. In reality, the counterfactual
is this: we assume that the Commission imposes sanctions in the infringement
procedure (and that they – in themselves – would be proportionate). The
undertakings would then still suffer the additional costs incurred in the course
of further investigations (and possibly judicial review) and the costs reflected
by the risk aversion factor because of the undertakings’ continued uncertainty
of the eventual outcome. The only difference is that these costs would be less
visible because in the infringement procedure they are dissipated as “friction”
costs of the administrative and legal process, while in the commitment
decision they become a visible part of the commitments.The overall burden on
the undertakings does not change – to them it does not matter whether the
costs are incurred as indirect friction costs (in the case of the infringement
procedure), or as costs in the form of additional commitments. I can see no
reason why a proportionality test should take into account the avoided costs of
investigation/litigation and the concomitant uncertainty to the extent they are
transformed into commitments – and thus, hopefully, contribute some social
value –, but not to the extent they are dissipated as friction costs. In other
words: if we worry about risk aversion and the costs of the investigation and
litigation in the commitment procedure, then we would also have to take these
factors into account when deciding on the proportionality of sanctions
imposed in the infringement procedure. If we do not take them into account in
the infringement procedure – and we do not –, then there is no reason to raise
concerns about them in the commitment procedure.67
Nor can it be as such decisive that the Commission can impose a sanction
against the undertakings in an infringement decision following the breakdown
of negotiations.68Every contracting party, even in a simple private contract, is
able to impose a “sanction” of some sort on the other party if the negotiations
67. For these reasons I consider the argument by Rab, Monnoyeur and Sukhtankar, op. cit.
supra note 3, 182, that the voluntary nature of Art. 9 does not sufficiently constrain the
Commission’s discretion because “the benefits of an Article 9 decision may well heavily
influence the undertaking to agree to commitments”, without more, a non sequitur.
68. But see Waelbroeck, “Le développement en droit européen de la concurrence
des solutions negociées (engagement, non-contestations des faits et transactions):
que va-t-il rester aux juges?”, GCLC Working Paper 1/08, available at
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fail. In the simplest case, this is the “sanction” of refusing to deal on the terms
proposed by the other party; but in the case of settlement negotiations between
private parties it may also be the enforcement of some external, possibly
substantial, claim against the other party. The availability of a sanction as a
threat to be realized in case of the breakdown of negotiations does not set the
commitment procedure apart from purely private negotiations.
Another apparent difference is that in the private contracting context, the
sanction is of a given – though perhaps ex ante uncertain – magnitude. Private
parties are “bargaining in the shadow of the law”.69 The property rights of
these parties and the resulting threat points are fixed in that they are not
contingent on the failure or success of the negotiations. In contrast, in the
commitment procedure, there may be a danger – or at least a perception on the
part of the undertakings – that the Commission uses its discretion such as to
impose harsher sanctions where a party was given the chance to resolve the
dispute in the commitment procedure and refused to offer commitments that
were acceptable to the Commission. In other words, undertakings may offer
commitments because they fear that the very fact that the negotiations with the
Commission break down would induce the Commission to impose harsher
remedies in a subsequent infringement decision than it would have imposed in
an infringement decision imposed without prior negotiations.70 There are
incentives for the Commission to do this: after all, imposing harsher sanctions
after the breakdown of negotiations may have valuable reputational effects for
the Commission, because such a reputation increases the bargaining power in
negotiations for commitments in future cases. To the extent the Commission
has discretion as to the sanctions in the infringement procedure, it has the
power to manipulate the other party’s threat point.
This power on part of the Commission over the other party’s threat point –
even if it is not actually exercised – may lead the undertaking to expect a
sanction in the top range of the distribution of proportionate sanctions, instead
of the middle range of this distribution; the undertakingmay accordingly offer
higher commitments. This does not, however, explain why the undertaking
should expect a disproportionate sanction in the infringement procedure (in
which case it could seek judicial review, a possibility it would entirely or
<www.coleurop.be/template.asp?pagename=gclcworkingpapers>, 3; Waelbroeck, op. cit.
supra note 1, p. 222; Körber, op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 81–82; Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 4,
p. 559.
69. To quote the oft-used phrase byMnookin andKornhauser, “Bargaining in the shadow of
the law: the case of divorce”, 88 Yale L.J. (1979), 950.
70. Similarly Wils, op. cit. supra note 3, 350, in discussing the question when there is
improper compulsion in settlements (though in the context of the cartel settlement procedure).
Kellerbauer (2010), op. cit. supra note 5, 658, rejects the insinuation that the imposition of a
fine could be contingent on the refusal to offer disproportionate commitments.
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largely forgo when opting for the commitment procedure). Accordingly, this
apparent difference cannot fully explain a tendency to offer disproportionate
commitments, either.71The argument does have residualmerit if one takes into
account the uncertainty about the range of proportionate remedies, and the
uncertainty about the extent of judicial deference or mistakes in this respect.72
If there is a problem with the Commission’s bargaining power in the
commitment procedure, it has to lie somewhere else. The Commission would
have to be able to use leverage in the commitment procedure that would allow
it to impose remedies that would be disproportionate if they were part of an
infringement decision.
The first way in which the commitment procedure allows the inclusion of
factors that could not be legitimately included in an imposed sanction is that
the Commission has the power to vary “sanctions” outside the proceeding at
hand. The suggestion that the Commission might treat undertakings in
separate proceedings – such as future merger decisions – less favourably
because they did not accede to requests by the Commission to offer certain
commitments may seem contrived, if not paranoid. However, as the aphorism
attributed to Henry Kissinger notes: “Just because you’re paranoid does not
mean they are not out to get you”. More importantly, it suffices that the
undertakings are “paranoid” in this respect, even if the Commission really is
not “out to get” them: it is the undertakings subjective probability that
influences their calculation.
The second way in which the Commission can use sanctions it could not
include in an infringement decision as leverage in the commitment procedure
is to transform third parties’ claims into additional concessions from the
undertakings. One of the incentives for undertakings to offer commitments is
the hope to avoid private litigation in the form of follow-on actions in the wake
of an infringement decision.73 To the extent that the substitution of a
71. Put more simply: in a settlement procedure between private parties, the negotiating
parties always expect the other party to try to enforce their maximum claim should negotiations
break down. The mere fact that a public authority has some discretion in choosing from a range
of possible sanctions, and that in the circumstances described above the authority may choose
the maximum (proportionate) sanctions should therefore not make a difference.
72. Similarly Bruzzone and Boccaccio, op. cit. supra note 63, 100.
73. Cf. Wils, op. cit. supra note 3, 344; Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, 210–211, 223; Rab,
Monnoyeur and Sukhtankar, op. cit. supra note 3, 175. The fear of damages actions is
undoubtedly a great motivation for settling in the US. In the EU, damages actions may currently
be less of a concern; the few damages actions concentrate on cartel cases, in which the
commitment procedure is unavailable (see supra note 13). However, one must not confuse a
dearth of damages actions with a dearth of private enforcement (cf. Peyer, “Injunctive relief and
private antitrust enforcement”, (2011) CCP Working Paper No. 11-7, available at SSRN:
<ssrn.com/abstract=1861861>): undertakings may well fear private actions seeking injunctive
relief on the heels of a finding of an infringement.
CML Rev. 2012948 Wagner-Von Papp
commitment decision for the infringement decision makes private
enforcement impossible or more difficult, the incentive for undertakings to
offer commitments is increased.74 The Commission is able to transform any
deterrent effect of future private litigation into a bargaining chip for extracting
further-reaching commitments in the public enforcement procedure.75
These two effects cast into doubt the assertion that the negotiations between
the parties are a sufficient guarantee for the “correctness” of the negotiated
solution.76 This raises the question whether one should give up the reluctance
to look behind the agreed-upon result of the negotiations, and if so, to what
extent.
4.2. Third-party interests and the public interest in a competitive process
While the previously discussed deviations of the commitment procedure from
the contract-law paradigm go to the problem of whether negotiations ensure
that the commitments are necessary, another deviation from the contract-law
paradigm calls into doubt that the commitments are adequate to address
competition law concerns. Contract law is concerned with the rights and
obligations of the contracting parties. Competition law, in contrast, inherently
deals with externalities imposed on third parties and on the public interest.77
The voluntariness of an offer of commitments does not guarantee in any way
74. Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5 , p. 657; Temple Lang, “Commitment decisions and
settlements with antitrust authorities and private parties under European antitrust law”, in Hawk
(Ed.), op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 265, 272.
75. This gives a curious twist to the Commission’s efforts to strengthen private
enforcement, which ostensibly has the sole purpose of ensuring “compensation”, and not the
purpose to deter. Once private enforcement is strengthened, the Commission can transform the
(strengthened) claims of parties seeking compensation into an additional bargaining chip to
extract commitments – which furthers mostly the goal of deterrence, and will at best have an
indirect compensatory effect (unless the commitment procedure is used to compensate victims,
see suggestions by Bourgeois and Strievi, “EU competition remedies in consumer cases:
Thinking out of the shopping bag”, 33 World Comp. (2010), 241, 245–248).
76. Prior to the AG’s Opinion and the ECJ’s judgment in Alrosa, the propositions that the
undertakings’ consent was not sufficient to eliminate the need for an external constraint and that
commitments should not go beyond the remedies that could be imposed in an infringement
decision were nearly universally accepted. See e.g. Wils, op. cit. supra note 2, 352, 356;
Bruzzone and Boccaccio, op. cit. supra note 63, 100 (but cf. Cook, op. cit. supra note 2,
212–213). The ECJ’s judgment broke with this near-consensus by stating (Alrosa, cited supra
note 5, para 47): “There is . . . no reason why the measure which could possibly be imposed in
the context of Article 7 of Regulation No 1/2003 should have to serve as a reference for the
purpose of assessing the extent of the commitments accepted under Article 9 . . . or why
anything going beyond that measure should automatically be regarded as disproportionate”.
77. While I do not consider there to be a public interest separate from the constitutive private
parties’ interests, it may make sense to distinguish between identifiable third parties, and the
dispersed public interest in the process of competition.
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that third-party interests or the public interest in the process of competition are
well served.78 Concededly, in the commitment procedure – in contrast to
anticompetitive agreements between private parties – these third-party
interests and the public interest are to some degree represented by the
Commission, aided by third-party comments in the Article 27(4) market test
procedure.79 Nevertheless, for the following reasons the Commission may be
a less reliable agent for the public interest in the commitment procedure than
it usually is in the infringement procedure.
First, and perhaps most importantly, the Commission does not have the
benefit of a full investigation into the facts.80 While this disadvantage is
attenuated by the possibility of reopening the proceedings where the decision
was based on incomplete, incorrect or misleading information provided by the
parties,81 the question is whether anybody is ever actively looking for the facts
that were missed the first time around.82
Secondly, without a full investigation into the facts, the adequacy and the
proportionality of the remedies can be assessed only tentatively. In the
extreme case, theremay be a danger of unwittingly imposing remedies that are
themselves anticompetitive.83
Thirdly, comments by third parties in the market test procedure need not
reflect the full extent of the public interest at stake, especially if the negative
externalities from any remaining competitive restraints are dispersed among
many stakeholders with a low degree of coordination.
Fourthly, and more subtly, another distinguishing feature between the
infringement procedure and the commitment procedure is the difference in the
dynamic interaction that develops in an adversarial setting on the one hand and
a consensual setting on the other hand. Top-down competition law
enforcement by authoritative command in the infringement procedure ensures
a clear separation of interests in the struggle between the opponents: one side
is represented by the competition authority, the other side is represented by the
undertakings suspected of infringing competition law. In this adversarial
setting, the competition authority ideally makes up for the defect that
78. Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 647; Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 577.
79. See Art. 27(4) of Regulation 1/2003.
80. Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 647.
81. Art. 9(2)(c) Regulation 1/2003.
82. But see, Wils, op. cit. supra note 3, 346, who largely discounts the problem, relying on
the possibility of reopening proceedings and on enforcement by NCAs and private plaintiffs; I
ammore sceptical as to the de facto effectiveness of both these attenuating factors.A reopening
or enforcement by other actors may be possible where the anticompetitive effects are felt by
well-coordinated interest groups that can lobby the Commission into reopening the proceedings
(or, less likely, even litigate the case themselves).Where these effects are dispersed, both checks
on the commitment decision likely fail.
83. Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 134–135.
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“competition has no lobby”;84 the authority is, again ideally, an advocate that
takes a stand for the public interest in upholding the competitive process, an
interest which is usually so dispersed among the market participants that
private incentives to take remedial action are sufficiently low as to make
apathy rational. Of course, even in the best of circumstances, the literature on
public choice teaches us that the competition authority, or more precisely its
officials, will be subject to various conflicting incentives which could lead to
enforcement that is either overzealous or under-ambitious.The introduction of
negotiations between the opponents brings with it the spectre of transforming
the adversarial procedure, which on balance safeguards both the public
interest and the private interests of the parties concerned, into a common quest
for a mutually acceptable solution, in which the interests of the authority and
the undertakings concerned become more and more aligned. This gradual
identification of a common purpose may be to the detriment of third-party
interests and the public interest, if only because of confirmation bias – where
a consensual resolution seems within reach, the Commission officials may be
tempted to view the available evidence in a light more favourable to the
undertakings concerned than if they were pursuing an infringement
procedure.85
For all these reasons, it is possible that the Commission is a less reliable
agent for third-party interests and the public interest in the commitment
procedure than it is in the infringement procedure.
The degree to which third-party interests and the public interest are really
endangered by these potential failures of the commitment procedure depends,
inter alia, on the availability of complementary enforcement mechanisms. To
the extent third parties have the right to take action against remaining
competitive restraints and this is not only a theoretical possibility de iure but
also a realistic option de facto, we need not worry too much about the
third-party interest aspect.To the extent that National CompetitionAuthorities
(NCAs) may, and realistically will, take action against remaining competitive
84. This adage (“Der Wettbewerb hat keine Lobby”) is attributed to Franz Böhm, cf.
Möschel, “Die Wettbewerbsordnung als Grundelement der Sozialen Marktwirtschaft” in
Ascheri et al. (Eds.), “Ins Wasser geworfen und Ozeane überquert” : Festschrift für Knut
Wolfgang Nörr (Böhlau, 2003), pp. 609, 612.
85. Cf. the district court’s description in In re RelafenAntitrust Litigation, 231 F.R.D. 52, 87
(D. Mass. 2005): “This development [i.e. the agreement on a settlement in principle]
transformed the dynamics of litigation virtually overnight. . . . [t]he parties wanted settlement,
not trial, and all attention turned to effectuating it. Nor could the Court any longer trust in the
adversary system. At once, ‘the law’ – so carefully scrutinized in determining the summary
judgment motion seemed to take a back seat to more practical needs in the minds of everyone
but the Court.” This case concerned a private class action, in which the danger of the plaintiff’s
“capture” is no doubt much greater than in the case of the Commission; but the institutional
potential for such a dynamic to develop still seems plausible to me.
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restraints against which no private actions are brought, we need not worry
about the public interest aspect.
The problem is that the extent to which private third parties and NCAs may
enforce competition law with regard to infringements that have been the
subject of commitment decisions is not even uncontroversial de iure; in fact,
this matter has been called one of “tremendous murkiness”.86And quite apart
from the doctrinal controversy, it seems extremely unlikely de facto that an
NCA would take action.
De iure, Recital 13 of Regulation 1/2003 appears to leave third-party private
actions and actions by NCAs completely unaffected: “Commitment decisions
are without prejudice to the powers of competition authorities and courts of
theMember States to make such a finding [i.e. of an infringement] and decide
upon the case”; and this is reconfirmed in Recital 22: “Commitment decisions
adopted by the Commission do not affect the power of the courts and the
competition authorities of the Member States to applyArticles [101 and 102]
of the Treaty.” A first indication that Recitals 13 and 22 are not as absolute as
they look was the memorandum on commitment decisions, which stated that
the companies “may still face enforcement action before Member States’
authorities and courts, provided that the uniform application of the
competition rules throughout the EU is not jeopardized.”87 Article 16
Regulation 1/2003 presumably excludes at least the possibility of qualifying
as an infringement conduct that is positively required in the operative part of
the commitment decision, and of ordering an undertaking to do something that
is prohibited in the operative part of the commitments.88 In addition, and
despite the statements in Recitals 13 and 22, it is controversial in how far
NCAs and national courts can find an infringement of competition law
conduct subsequent to the adoption of the commitment decision. Some argue
that such a finding would infringe Article 16 Regulation 1/2003, the
prohibition of rendering decisions “running counter” prior Commission
decisions.89 The answer to this question is to some extent influenced, though
86. See Marquis, “Introduction: Cartel settlements and commitment decisions”, in
Ehlermann and Marquis, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. xxix, lxiii, taking up Forrester’s remark in
Panel V, in ibid., p. 540.
87. MEMO/04/217 of 17 Sep. 2004 (emphasis added).
88. See Gippini-Fournier, op. cit. supra note 65, 32–33; Marquis, op. cit. supra note 86, pp.
lxiv-lxv; Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 226, and Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 74, p. 287
(both extending the conduct exempt from further scrutiny to conduct that is clearly implied by
commitments); Wils, op. cit. supra note 2, 362 (injunctive relief remains possible “unless the
injunction would make it impossible for the undertaking concerned to comply (also) with the
commitments made binding “); Rab, Monnoyeur and Sukhtankar, op. cit. supra note 3, 184.
89. E.g. de Bronett, op. cit. supra note 46, Art. 9 para 8. Waelbroeck, op. cit. supra note 1,
pp. 230–233, and Wiedemann, “Zur Bindungswirkung von Entscheidungen der Kommission
über Verpflichtungszusagen nachArt. 9 VO Nr. 1/2003 gegenüber nationalen Kartellbehörden
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not predetermined, by one’s stance on yet another controversial question:
whether the commitments must completely remove all the concerns raised in
the preliminary assessment, or whether the commitments only need to reduce
the competitive concerns to such an extent that it is permissible for the
Commission to conclude that the remaining concerns are no longer an
enforcement priority.90 At least if one takes the latter view, any remaining
infringements may still be prioritized by NCAs or taken up by private parties
without “running counter” to the Commission decision.91 If one otherwise
considered the commitment decision to immunize against actions seeking
relief for infringements subsequent to the adoption of the commitment
decision, however, this would require a determination to what extent the
commitment decision completely removed the competitive concerns and to
what extent the infringements remain.92
Even to the extent that private enforcement and/or enforcement by NCAs
remains possible de iure, it seems unlikely that these enforcement
mechanisms would de facto satisfactorily fill any gap left by
under-enforcement on part of the Commission.93 In cases in which the
Commission does not (yet) have sufficient facts to pursue an infringement
decision, it seems unlikely that private litigants have better information; if they
had, they would presumably use the market test stage to make their
information available to the Commission. Nor is it likely that private litigants
can easily gain access to this information; with the limited disclosure
requirements in the national laws of the Member States, it seems unlikely that
und Kartellgerichten” in Reese et al., Festschrift für Ulf Doepfner zum 65. Geburtstag (C.H.
Beck, 2008), pp. 89, 92–97, want to rely on the wording of the commitment decision. For the
(preferable) view that “[n]either the finding by a national court that there has been no
infringement nor a finding that there has been an infringement” would run counter to the
commitment decision, see e.g. Wils op. cit. supra note 2, 360, 361–362; Whish, op. cit. supra
note 2, p. 569; Gippini-Fournier, op. cit. supra note 65, 30–33 (also discussing, and correctly
rejecting, ne bis in idem concerns); Schwarze and Weitbrecht, Europäisches
Kartellverfahrensrecht (Nomos, 2004), § 6 para 95. Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 655,
would allow the finding of an infringement and the imposition of sanctions at least where the
NCA or national court have made additional factual or legal findings. Also cf. the lively Panel
V discussion in Ehlermann and Marquis, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 525, 534–545; Rab,
Monnoyeur and Sukhtankar, op. cit. supra note 3, 184–185; Georgiev, op. cit. supra note 3,
1030; Körber, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 80.
90. Cf., for the latter proposition, Whish, op. cit. supra note 2, p. 569; Wils, op. cit. supra
note 2, 357–358; von Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 41, 246–247. For the former view, see
Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 646; Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 561–562, 576. For
an extensive discussion, see Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 74, pp. 287–290.
91. Wils, op. cit. supra note 2, 362.
92. Impracticable as such a determination may seem, this is indeed suggested by
Waelbroeck, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 231–232 (distinguishing on the basis of thewording of the
commitment decision).
93. Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 4, pp. 575–576.
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information can be uncovered that was unavailable to the Commission.94 Nor
will NCAs be queuing up to jump into the breach: from an ex ante perspective,
it is hardly the best use of scarce enforcement resources to look into a case
which was already looked into and discarded by another enforcer; and
additionally, the NCAs could have voiced any concerns in the Commission’s
commitment procedure.95 Additionally, the de facto probability of action by
NCAs and national courts is negatively affected by the uncertainty about the
de iure position described above. A last indication that the enforcement by
NCAs and national courts in commitment cases is de facto negligible is that
otherwise commitment decisions would be of very limited value to
undertakings, and this contrasts with the high demand for commitment
decisions.
If this assessment that commitment decisions largely shield the
undertakings against action byNCAs and private plaintiffs is correct – and this
may be an explanation for the unexpected increase of the attractiveness of the
commitment procedure following the abolition of the notification system –,96
then there is a danger that a premature commitment decision may in some
cases be worse than a simple closing of the file. Accordingly, the a maiore ad
minus argument that the Commission’s discretion to adopt a commitment
decisionmust be as wide as the discretion to close the case informally is not an
inference that is compelled by logic.97
4.3. The public-law consequences of the “contract”
Furthermore, the public-law nature of commitments rears its head when it
comes to breaches of the “contract”: if a fine of up to 10 percent of the annual
worldwide turnover were imposed as a contractual penalty for conduct that –
absent the binding commitments – might well have been legal, courts would
likely hesitate before enforcing the clause.98
94. Georgiev, op. cit. supra note 3, 1005. However, depending on the procedural regime, the
commitment decision could suffice to overcome the preliminary threshold for obtaining
disclosure, see Dekeyser, Becker and Calisti, “Impact of public enforcement on antitrust
damages actions” in Ehlermann and Marquis (Eds.), op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 677, 683.
95. Cf.Whish, op. cit. supra note 2, pp. 567–568; Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, 227;Wils, op.
cit. supra note 2, 363.
96. Cf. Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 122.
97. For such an inference based on logic cf. Wils, op. cit. supra note 2, 347. Wils takes
Recitals 13 and 22 largely at face value (see supra note 89), so that his argument is logically
consistent if one confines oneself to the de iure position. On thewidemargin of discretion under
current case law, see Wils, op. cit. supra note 47, 363.
98. Of course, the fine would have to take into account the gravity and duration of the
infringement; but the infringement in this case would be the breach of the commitments, and so
it is at best unclear in how far the legality of the conduct (irrespective of the commitments)
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This aspect may become particularly problematic when combined with the
concern that the Commission may seek remedies that are in themselves
anticompetitive. If the commitments prohibit conduct that would otherwise be
permissible under competition law, then the commitments restrict the range of
options available to the undertakings bound by these commitments – and the
restriction of otherwise legitimate business conduct may in itself amount to a
restriction of competition.99 The harsh penalty for any deviation from the
binding commitments renders the promise of adhering to the commitments
credible. Thus, the commitment decision may perversely act as a credible
signal of the undertakings to their competitors that the undertakings will
refrain from competing on certain parameters. Of course, this argument
assumes that the Commission is duped into acting unwittingly as an accessory
to restrictive conduct. This would ordinarily not be a likely scenario; however,
it does not seem out of the question given the preliminary nature of the
investigation into the facts in commitment procedures.100
4.4. A preliminary summary
While the “voluntary” nature of commitments has contractual overtones,
various features should caution against taking the analogy too far.
- In contrast to the situation of private parties settling their disputes, the
Commission may be able to extract commitments that go beyond the remedies
available in an infringement decision – not only in terms of “what” can be
imposed, but also in terms of “how much”. The self-interest of the parties in
negotiations, on which contract law relies as a nearly exclusive guarantor for
would influence the assessment of the fine for breaches of commitments. Cf. Schwarze and
Weitbrecht, op. cit. supra note 89, § 6 para 85.
99. Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 657; Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 4, pp.
134–135. Where national competition authorities impose commitment decisions that have
anticompetitive effects, this could potentially be challenged as an infringement of the effet utile
principle.
100. Assume, for example, that the Commission investigates an undertaking (U) inMember
States A, B and C, and finds that the undertaking is dominant in these Member States and
employs fidelity rebates. U offers commitments not to use fidelity rebates or bundled discounts
in Member StatesA-F, and the Commission makes these commitments binding, even though it
has not investigated the competitive situation in Member States D-F. Assume further that U is
not dominant inMember States D-F, and that competitorV actually dominates these markets. U
is prevented from engaging in legitimate competitive conduct to the detriment of the consumers
that could have profited from rebates and discounts by a non-dominant undertaking, and to the
detriment of the process of competition that could have undermined V’s market power. Even
worse, U can use the commitments as a credible signal to V that it will not seek to enter these
other markets, and that it will concentrate all its power onMember StatesA-C. Onemight reject
as unrealistic the notion that the Commission could extend the commitments beyond the
geographical market investigated; but see the Coca Cola case, cited supra note 54.
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the correctness of the outcome, is still a constraint on the commitments that
can be extracted from the undertakings. However, for the reasons explained
above,101 it is doubtful whether the “voluntary nature” of commitments is a
perfect substitute for the proportionality test applicable to infringement
decisions.
- While contract law is concerned with rights and obligations of the
contractual parties, competition law is mostly about the externalities on
third-parties and the public interest. The Commission is usually the agent for
these latter interests. In the infringement procedure, the Commission has both
the incentive and the means to be an effective agent. In the commitment
procedure, both the incentive and the means for being a vigorous enforcer of
the principals’ interests are attenuated. Nor do complementary enforcement
mechanisms likely constitute a sufficient protection for third-party interests
and the public interest: even to the extent they are available de iure, private
enforcement and enforcement by the NCAs are particularly unlikely in cases
in which the Commission has resolved the case by a commitment decision.
- In the extreme case, undertakings may offer commitments that are in
themselves anticompetitive. The severe sanctions against breaching
commitments ensure that the “promise” to other market participants to refrain
from (or engage in) certain market behaviour is a credible one.
Overall, these differences between commitments and private contracts
should lead to the conclusion that the voluntary nature of commitments is not
a sufficient guarantee for the “correctness” of the negotiated outcome. In
addition to the partial constraint that the requirement of consent undoubtedly
exercises, the control of the substantive correctness of commitment decisions
requires additional, external constraints.
5. The lost benefits of the infringement procedure
The effect of the ECJ’s judgment in Alrosa of reducing the strict demands of
the rule of law in favour of a presumption for the substantive correctness of
quasi-contractual solutions,102 is that the Commission is subjected to
markedly fewer constraints in the commitment procedure than in the
infringement procedure.
Infringement decisions underArticle 7 Regulation 1/2003 and the sanctions
imposed under thisArticle and/orArticles 23, 24 of this regulation are subject
to the constraints of the rule of law, and as a consequence have various
101. See supra text accompanying notes 69–76.
102. See supra section 3.4.
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beneficial effects:103 (1) the infringement must be proven to the “requisite
legal standard”;104 (2) the remedies imposed must be the ones mandated or at
least permitted by the legal provisions onwhich the Commission relies;105 and
(3) they must be necessary and proportionate means to end the infringement;
both (4) the finding of an infringement and (5) the proportionality of the
remedies imposed are subject to judicial review. As a consequence of this
judicial review, the Commission has an ex ante incentive (6) to make a full
enquiry into the facts before rendering an infringement decision, and (7) to
scrutinize the proportionality of the remedies in detail. (8) In the infringement
procedure, the Commission is not only legally bound to make sure that the
remedies “bring the infringement effectively to an end”, but it also has an
incentive to do this, because the incentives of the Commission in the
infringement process are primarily antagonistic to those of the undertaking.
(9)The final decision – either the decision of the competition authority or that
of the courts on judicial review – will be a pronouncement of what the law is.
The decision will therefore help to shed light on what was previously the
“penumbra” of the scope of the legal provisions in question, and the decision
will thus provide legal certainty for future cases. (10) The infringement
decision will also assert the legal principle, and (11) contain a – more or less
pronounced – statement of opprobrium of the infringement. The resulting
“bad publicity” may contribute to the deterrent effect of any fines imposed,
and additionally result in the benefits of what is sometimes called “positive
general deterrence”. (12) Apart from being an end in itself, the finding of an
infringement may serve as a basis for fines under Article 23 Regulation
1/2003, and (13) for private enforcement in the form of follow-on actions.
Some of these benefits are inevitably lost or reduced in the commitment
procedure as established in Regulation 1/2003; others may be lost, depending
on the choice of how to implement the commitment procedure. Recital 13
states that “[c]ommitment decisions should find that there are no longer
grounds for action by the Commission without concluding whether or not
there has been or still is an infringement” (my emphasis).106 This
103. Partly based onWils, op. cit. supra note 2, 349, andWils, op. cit. supra note 3, 342; see
also Cengiz, op. cit. supra note 5, 135–138; Klees, op. cit. supra note 40, 376–377.
104. Whatever this “requisite standard” may be: see Gippini-Fournier, “The elusive
standard of proof in EU competition cases”, 33 World Comp. (2010), 187.
105. In the case of Art. 7 Regulation 1/2003, the legal constraints in this regard are
admittedly negligible, because this provision empowers the Commission to impose any
behavioural or structural remedy.The legal constraints are entirely shifted to the proportionality
test.
106. A clause in US settlements to the same effect has recently been criticized by a US
American court, see SEC v. Citigroup Global Markets, Slip Op. 2011 WL 5903733 at 5
(S.D.N.Y. 2011); see also the Public Comments by AARP in United States v. Morgan
Stanley, Civil action no. 11-civ–6875 WHP (S.D.N.Y.) available at
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automatically rules out that the infringement must be proven to the requisite
legal standard (1) and that judicial review could enquire into the existence of
an infringement (4); this absence of judicial review as to the existence of an
infringement also diminishes the de facto incentive for the Commission to
make a full enquiry into the facts (6).107 The lack of a finding of an
infringement eliminates the possibility of fines (12), and the possibility for
private plaintiffs to rely on a prejudicial effect (13). 108 In addition, because the
preliminary assessment is not as detailed as the factual findings in an
infringement procedure, private plaintiffs will have to find other sources to
prove the infringement. By definition, the commitment decision does not
contribute to the clarification of the legal boundaries (9) and it does not assert
the legal principle applied (10) or carry a statement of opprobrium (11). The
intrinsic incentive to ensure the effectiveness of the remedy (8) may be
weakened by the desire to finalize the negotiations.109
This leaves the constraints (2), (3), (5) and (7). Constraint (2) is negligible
even in the infringement procedure,110 and can therefore not be expected to be
an effective constraint in the commitment procedure. Constraints (3), (5) and
(7) all concern facets of the proportionality principle: the legal obligation to
impose only proportionate remedies (3), the judicial review of compliance
with the principle (5), and the resulting de facto incentive for the Commission
to comply (7). Accordingly, the degree to which the content of commitment
decisions is constrained by the rule of law depends nearly exclusively on the
extent to which they are subjected to a proportionality test.
6. Potential benefits of the commitment procedure
The mere fact that certain sacrifices need to be made when substituting a
commitment decision for an infringement decision is, of course, not decisive.
Whether these sacrifices are worth their cost depends on the concomitant
<www.justice.gov/atr/cases/morgan.html> (but see section IV.B. of the Response of the United
States of 6 Mar. 2012, ibid.). – The point here is not that Art. 9 commitment decisions should
have to include admissions of liability (as seems to be the argument in the aforementioned
decision in Citigroup and AARP’s public comment in Morgan Stanley), only that the
non-admission of liability makes it impossible for a commitment decision to fulfill certain
objectives an infringement decision could fulfil.
107. The questionwhether the Commission is legally obliged tomake a full enquiry into the
facts, or at least live up to a certain minimum standard (seeWils, op. cit. supra note 3, 346), is
a separate one; but the de facto incentive is certainly diminished.
108. De facto, commitment decisions may still have some probative value, but de iure there
is neither an admission of liability nor a finding of liability on which the plaintiffs could build.
109. See supra text accompanying note 85.
110. See supra note 105.
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benefits.111 The benefits of commitment decisions as a form of consensual
dispute resolution are well known from the literature in favour of alternative
dispute resolution (ADR). Consensual decisions are speedier and less
costly.112 Commitment decisions are speedier because, first, the Commission
need not engage in the time-consuming task of finding facts and evidence that
would hold up in court,113 and secondly, the negotiated remedies are by design
more acceptable to the parties of the negotiations, thus avoiding protracted
litigation.114 This will often be an advantage for all actors:115 for the
competition authority, because it can concentrate its scarce resources on other
infringements; for the undertakings, because the quick resolution saves
litigation costs and the undertakings can turn their attention to activities which
are more profitable; and for the public interest, especially where a lengthy
investigation and contentious court battle would have rendered any remedy
meaningless because competition would have been choked off in the
meantime, perhaps irrevocably.116
The commitment procedure may also allow more “flexible” remedies than
could be imposed in an infringement decision. In contrast to the time- and
cost-effectiveness, however, the “flexible remedy” argument is a
double-edged sword. On the one hand, the less constrained the parties are in
what they can bring to the negotiation table, the more the range of available
options for trade and therefore the potential bargaining surplus is increased –
as the cliché goes, the pie to be divided becomes larger. If one of the parties is
particularly keen on a remedy that would not be available in adjudication, this
111. More elaborate discussions of the advantages and disadvantages for undertakings and
the Commission respectively can be found, e.g., in Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, 210–213; Rab,
Monnoyeur and Sukhtankar, op. cit. supra note 3, 175–176;Wils, op. cit. supra note 2, 349–352.
112. Cengiz, op. cit. supra note 5, 130; Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, 210; Rab, Monnoyeur
and Sukhtankar, op. cit. supra note 3, 175; Wils, op. cit. supra note 3, 343–344; Kellerbauer
(2011), op. cit. supra note 5, 3; Bruzzone and Boccaccio, op. cit. supra note 63, 99.
113. But note the trade-off: if one requires the Commission to be far advanced in their
fact-finding so as to avoid missing crucial facts (Wils, op. cit. supra note 3, 346, with good
reason), one cannot at the same time advance the time-saving aspect with regard to the
fact-finding stage. If, on the other hand, one promotes the time-saving aspect with regard to
the fact-finding stage as an advantage, one has to concede the possible negative effects on the
adequacy of the commitments. Also, one has to be careful not to compare isolated, extremely
long-lasting cases in infringement investigations with particularly speedy commitment
procedures. In the one case in which a direct comparison is possible (the CISAC case, see text
surrounding note 53 supra), it took the Commission less than a year to issue an infringement
decision after negotiations broke down.Themain advantagewould seem to be the time saved by
avoiding judicial review.
114. Kellerbauer (2011), op. cit. supra note 5, 3 with fn. 24, notes that no addressee has ever
challenged a commitment decision; the few challenges that do exist were always initiated by
third parties.
115. Wils, op. cit. supra note 3, 343–344.
116. Cf. Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 142.
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party may agree to substantial concessions elsewhere.117 To resort to yet
another cliché from the sales talk of ADR proponents: using settlements
instead of adjudication may create a win-win situation.118
This option to include “extra-legal” remedies is sometimes hailed as a
benefit of negotiated solutions in competition cases as well.119AsArticle 7 of
Regulation 1/2003 does not constrain the Commission’s power as to the nature
of the remedy, the “flexible” remedy actually is a euphemism that stands for a
remedy that would not have been proportionate and necessary if imposed in an
infringement decision.120 The obvious examples from past Commission
practice are again the structural commitments in the energy sector. While
structural remedies could in theory also be imposed top-down based on
Article 7 Regulation 1/2003, the Commission has yet to make use of this
option, and the statutory preference for behavioural remedies over structural
remedies would make a successful appeal not unlikely.121 The parties’
voluntary submission to structural commitments in the energy cases was
almost certainly not based on an expectation that the Court of Justice would
uphold an order for structural remedies if the Commission had adopted it in an
Article 7 infringement decision. Instead, the parties presumably recognized
that the Commission was very keen on obtaining structural remedies, and saw
their chance for extracting more favourable concessions elsewhere in
return.122
117. An example may be the keenness of the Commission to obtain structural remedies in
the energy sector. Or, to give an illustration from a different area: in medical negligence cases,
patients apparently often have a desire to get an apology from the doctor, cf. O’Reilly, “‘I’m
Sorry’:Why is that so hard for doctors to say?”,AmericanMedical News, 8 Feb. 2010, available
at <www.ama-assn.org/amednews/2010/02/01/prsa0201.htm>. The law usually does not allow
a judge to impose an apology as a remedy, and at any rate it seems impossible to get a
meaningful apology if it is not voluntary. In a settlement, offering an apology imposes few costs
on the offeror and (apparently) provides real value to the offeree.
118. And who would want to spoil their fun by pointing out that virtually every contract
creates a win-win situation anyway?
119. cf. Georgiev, op. cit. supra note 3, 1012 (“Consent decrees also allow [the agencies] to
craft innovative remedies which might not have an express legal basis”); Cook, op. cit. supra
note 2, 212–213.
120. Klees, op. cit. supra note 40, 377.
121. Cf. the wording of the third sentence ofArt. 7(1) and Recital 12 of Regulation 1/2003.
Contrast von Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 41, 241 et seq. (structural remedy in these cases
proportionate) with Körber, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 87 (proportionality of the structural remedy
in RWE gas foreclosure case is “highly doubtful”) and Immenga, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 296
(legality of the structural remedy in E.ON “doubtful”).
122. Possibly in the form of the Commission’s refraining from imposing a substantial fine
(or possibly from initiating legislative action, which – given the unpopularity of energy
suppliers at the time – might have had some chance of realization); the risk of private follow-on
actions may also have been a consideration.
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7. Abandoning the “struggle for law”
Much of the argument above has focused on the possible disproportionality of
commitments. At least as problematic is the lack of supervision of the
adequacy of commitments.
Many commentators have pointed out that the real danger of the
commitment procedure is its overuse, resulting in a reduced body of litigated
cases that define the boundaries of competition law and assert the legal
principles at stake.123 The concern is one that is familiar from the critique
against the trend towards ADR in general. In the English-language literature
on ADR, the standard point of reference is Owen Fiss’s 1984 article,124 from
which a rich literature has developed.125 The concern is much older: in 1872,
Rudolf von Jhering considered it the moral duty of every person who was
consciously wronged by another person to contribute to the “struggle for law”
by litigating the case in order to keep alive the legal principles at stake, instead
of meekly absorbing the loss or settling the case.126 For public officials, he
considered this duty to be self-evident.127 Similarly, the law and economics
123. Forrester, “Creating new rules or closing easy cases?” in Ehlermann and Marquis, op.
cit. supra note 1, pp. 637–638, 647–648; Georgiev, op. cit. supra note 3, 1026–1029;
Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5, pp. 648, 657; Waelbroeck, op. cit. supra note 1, p. 224; Wils,
op. cit. supra note 3, 344–346; Wils, op. cit. supra note 2, 351–352; Bruzzone and Boccaccio,
op. cit. supra note 63, 99; also cf. Gippini-Fournier, op. cit. supra note 65, 43.The danger of the
Commission’s “flight into informality” was one of the earliest criticisms, see Schmidt,
“Umdenken im Kartellverfahrensrecht”, (2003) BB, 1237, 1242; see also Körber, op. cit. supra
note 4, pp. 82, 91; Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5, pp. 645, 657.
124. Fiss, “Against Settlement” 93 Yale L.J. (1984), 1073. Fiss’s article concerned primarily
cases of unequal bargaining power, ibid. at 1076 (many of his arguments in this regard seem to
be built on the wrong counterfactual – see my argument above (text following note 66) –, but
this may be due to the historical context in which Fiss was writing, namely the proposal to
introduce rules to penalize those parties that opt for litigation instead of settlement). But Fiss did
not limit his observations to cases brought by indigent parties; he included a number of
references to antitrust cases and procedures in his article, ibid. at 1076, 1081, 1083–1084. His
concerns in these cases were (1) the limited factual basis on which settlements were made and
(2) the lost opportunities for an authoritative interpretation of the law. It is these latter concerns
that are directly relevant here.
125. E.g. Luban, “Settlements and the erosion of the public realm”, 83 Georgetown L.J.
(1995), 2619; Resnik, “For Owen M. Fiss: Some reflections on the triumph and the death of
adjudication”, 58 Univ. of Miami L.Rev. (2004), 173 ; see also Resnik, “Whither and whether
adjudication?”, 86 Boston Univ. L.Rev. (2006), 1101, 1102, 1139 et seq.
126. Von Jhering, Der Kampf um’s Recht, 1st ed. (Manz’sche Buchhandlung, 1872), pp.
26–30 (in English: The Struggle for Law, 2nd ed. (Callahan, 1915; John J. Lalor, trans.)). Given
Fiss’s insistence onAmerica’s uniqueness and superiority to the rest of the world (see Fiss, op.
cit. supra note 124, 1089–90), it is not surprising he made no reference to von Jhering.
127. See von Jhering, op. cit. supra note 126, p. 71: “the realization of public law and of
criminal law is assured, because it is imposed as a duty on public officials”, a duty he considered
to be “absolute and unlimited” (ibid. at p. 74). He devoted most of his presentation to private
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literature has pointed to the positive externalities of adjudication, and the loss
of these externalities where the parties, considering only their private
interests, settle the case.128 The critique of the commitment procedure has
previously drawn on these two strands of literature.129 If anything, however,
the problem has been understated for two reasons.
First, in contrast to most cases discussed in the general ADR literature, the
commitment procedure does not merely eliminate one plaintiff or a limited
group of plaintiffs from a larger population of plaintiffs that could litigate the
case. It eliminates adjudication initiated by the Commission, and indirectly
curtails action by NCAs and private plaintiffs, and hence, at least de facto,
prevents adjudication in many cases completely.130 This may not be a problem
where cases involving the same legal issue come up on a regular basis; but
where opportunities for clarification are rare, the reduction in adjudication is
worrisome.
Secondly, there are reasons to suspect that the incentives for the
Commission are strong to settle precisely the “wrong” cases, namely those
cases in which the public benefits of adjudication would have been
particularly great. The most obvious benefit of fully adversarial adjudication
is the clarification of the law on novel legal issues.131 Such novel legal issues
can arise either in the context of finding an infringement on a novel theory of
harm, or in devising novel remedies. Unfortunately, the incentive for the
Commission to opt for the commitment procedure in these cases is strong for
several reasons. First, the probability of a reversal of an infringement decision
based on a novel theory of harm or employing novel remedies on judicial
reviewwould be high – by definition the Commission is testing the boundaries
of the legal provisions involved. By choosing the commitment procedure, the
law, because in the area of public law “even the dullest mind understands” that there is no
question whether or not to fight for what is right under the law; von Jhering, op. cit. supra note
126, pp. 21–22; the English translation (op. cit. supra note 126, pp. 21–22) of that particular
sentence does not quite capture the sentiment of the German original.
128. See e.g. Edwards and Padilla, “Antitrust settlements in the EU: Private incentives and
enforcement policy” in Ehlermann andMarquis, op. cit. supra note 1, pp. 661, 664 (with further
references).
129. See e.g. Georgiev, op. cit. supra note 3, 1015–1017.
130. For the de iure and de facto limitations facing NCAs and private plaintiffs as
alternative enforcers, see above (text accompanying notes 86–97). Georgiev, op. cit. supra note
3, 1016–1017, does not sufficiently take into account this difference between the general ADR
discussion and the antitrust settlement context when discounting the concerns against
settlements by referring to Luban’s reply to Fiss (op. cit. supra notes 125 and 124, respectively).
Having said this, in the U.S. some mandatory arbitration or mediation clauses in standard form
contracts covering an entire industry have a similarly comprehensive effect on excluding
potential plaintiffs.
131. Gippini-Fournier, op. cit. supra note 65, 42–43; Wils, op. cit. supra note 3, 344.
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Commission can largely avoid judicial review.132 In some of the commitment
decisions to date, this consideration may have played a role.133 The Rambus
case concerned “patent ambush” in technological standard-setting
procedures, an issue that had been the subject of heated discussion on both
sides of theAtlantic, and whose importance in high-technology industries will
arguably increase in the future. As a result of the Commission’s adoption of a
commitment decision instead of an infringement decision, there is still no
authoritative clarification of the European legal position on this issue.134
Structural remedies have never been used in the infringement procedure,
and the legal standards required to overcome the statutory preference for
behavioural remedies are consequently unclear. Instead of testing the limits in
an adversarial procedure, the Commission opted for the commitment
procedure in the energy cases.135
In the Alrosa case itself, the Commission sought the complete cessation of
dealings between De Beers and Alrosa. Under the theory of harm based on
Article 102 TFEU this would most likely have been an “overkill”, because
anticompetitive foreclosure effects might have been preventable by a
significant reduction of the sales volume (hence the qualms of the General
Court). The need for a complete cessation was probably more motivated by a
132. Wils, op. cit. supra note 2, 352. Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, 213, raises similar concerns
about the flight to the commitment procedure where the Commission perceives its case to be
weak. Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 4, p.143, appears to consider the possibility to “deal
pragmatically with novel or complex cases” as an advantage.
133. The enquiry into the Commission’s motives for choosing the commitment procedure
is necessarily speculative. In all cases described below, a number of reasons – some legitimate,
some less so –, can be advanced for choosing the commitment procedure. But even where there
are legitimate reasons, this does not exclude the possibility that less legitimate reasons crucially
influenced the decision.
134. The Qualcomm proceedings, raising related legal issues with regard to the level of –
fair, reasonable and non-discriminatory (FRAND) – royalties for technologies that formed part
of an industry standard, had been closed on 24 Nov. 2009, see MEMO/09/516. See now
Proceedings COMP/39985, 39986 –Motorola and COMP/39939 – Samsung.The statements in
the Guidelines on the applicability of Article 101 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the
European Union to horizontal co-operation agreements, O.J. 2011, C 11/1, paras. 257 et seq.,
are neither authoritative nor do they give comprehensive guidance. In formulating similar
concerns to those raised here Georgiev, op. cit. supra note 3, 1028, mentions the Coca-Cola
commitment decision as a problematic decision, because it addressed the “important and
contested area of law” of fidelity rebates; in this particular area of law, however, the
Commission did litigate the BritishAirways case (as Georgiev himself notes, see ibid. fn. 254).
I would consider it unobjectionable for the Commission to litigate one case to clarify the law
and settle other cases that raise the same – or sufficiently similar – questions.
135. See the discussion of the energy cases by von Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 41; Klees,
op. cit. supra note 40; Chauve, Godfried, Kovács, Langus, Nagy and Siebert, “The E.On
electricity cases: an antitrust decision with structural remedies”, (2009) Competition Policy
Newsletter, 51; Sagowska, “Energy liberalization in an antitrust straitjacket: A plant too far?”,
34 World Comp. (2011), 449.
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theory of harm under Article 101 TFEU: the anticompetitive effects of
dealings between competitors. On this issue, again, the law is far from
settled.136TheCommission avoided any decision on this theory of harm by not
only choosing the commitment procedure (in theArt. 102TFEU case), but by
closing the parallel proceeding under Article 101 TFEU entirely.
A second reason for which the Commissionmay bemore inclined to choose
the commitment procedure for novel legal issues is that such new issues in
today’s world often – though not always – arise in the context of complex
technological issues, or – under the “more economic approach” – are built on
complex economic models that require large amounts of input data. The
complexity of a case, in turn, is a legitimate argument for the Commission to
choose the commitment procedure. The danger is that the assessment focuses,
for reasons of myopia, too much on the complexity of the specific case, and
discounts hyperbolically the benefit of the precedential value that consists in
resolving the novel legal issue for future cases, even where a clear precedent
might have prevented these future cases, perhaps equally complex, from
arising. This does not only mean that the novel issue is not authoritatively
decided. It also means that in complex cases, where more fact-finding is
necessary to identify the correct theory of harm and to tailor the remedies to
this theory of harm, the Commission will actually spend less time and
resources on finding the infringement and adequate remedies, and the
Commission is therefore more likely to accept offers of inadequate
remedies.137
A third aspect of cases involving novel legal issues is that the Commission
would usually not impose a fine even in an infringement decision. This may,
again, increase the probability that the commitment procedure is chosen by the
Commission.138
136. For a discussion, see e.g. Wagner-von Papp, Marktinformationsverfahren: Grenzen
der Information imWettbewerb (Nomos, 2004), pp. 470–474.
137. Cf. Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 143.This is particularly problematic because
the undertakings involved recognize the Commission’s reluctance to embark on big, complex
cases, and are therefore likely to offer only inadequate commitments, ibid., pp. 142–143.
138. The absence of a fine could be significant for two reasons, but neither of them is likely
to play a great role. First, the absence of a fine may seem to open up the possibility for using the
commitment procedure in the first place (cf. Recital 13 of Reg. 1/2003). However, in practice
Recital 13 is interpreted as ruling out commitment decisions only in hardcore cartel cases, and
not in all cases in which a fine could conceivably be imposed (see supra notes 13 and 65). The
second reason for which the absence of a fine could be significant is that the Commission may
have less incentive to pursue the infringement procedure where no fine can be imposed.
However, where it is ex ante sufficiently certain that no fine will be imposed, the undertakings
concernedmay be less eager to offer commitments, off-setting the increasedwillingness on part
of the Commission.
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Apart from this direct loss of an authoritative interpretation of novel legal
issues, the use of commitment decisions arguably has indirect, but perhaps
equally pernicious effects on the incentives for the Commission to develop the
law through other means. Where “extra-legal” remedies can be extracted in
negotiations, there is no need to argue for legislative change, or for recognition
of a necessity for a broader remedial scope in the infringement procedure.139
Perhaps structural remedies really should be more widely available, generally
or in the energy sector.140 Perhaps the Commission should be able to prohibit
competitor dealings in certain circumstances.141 Perhaps remedies should
include more preventative measures, such as the elimination of interlocking
directorships,142 or ofminority shareholdings between competitors,143 or of an
exchange of statistical information between previously colluding competitors
that would be innocuous if exchanged between other undertakings.144
Personally, I would welcome some of these developments, but they are
changes from the status quo of the case law.The Commission may believe that
some or all of these remedies are already available in infringement decisions
de lege lata. If so, it should litigate cases to obtain an authoritative
interpretation by the Court. Instead, in infringement decisions “[t]he
Commission has always been unimaginative as far as remedies are concerned
. . . ”,145 which is understandable in light of the restrictive stance of the Court
of Justice.
More likely, the Commission believes that these remedies would not be
available under the lex lata, as interpreted by the Court, but that the use of
proactive remedies would instead require legislative action. If so, it would
seem to be an usurpation of legislative power to use these remedies in
negotiated procedures, an usurpation that results in an intermediate level of
intransparent “quasi-law” in the form of commitment decisions and merger
remedies. Having the ability to use these remedies in negotiated procedures –
139. For an excellent account of the concept of “discretionary remedialism” see Lianos, op.
cit. supra note 9. See also the contributions in Lianos (Ed.), Competition Law Remedies in
Europe (Hart Publishing, forthcoming).
140. See von Rosenberg, op. cit. supra note 41, 245.
141. See supra note 136.
142. The Commission has used commitments in the merger procedure to eliminate or
prevent such interlocking directorships. See Wagner-von Papp, op. cit. supra note 136, p. 430
with references to the Commission practice.
143. Again, the Commission has used the merger procedure to extract commitments to
divest minority shareholdings. See Wagner-von Papp, op. cit. supra note 136, pp. 427–431. In
this respect, there is at least some authoritative precedent, cf. Joined Cases 142 & 156/84, BAT
and Reynolds v. Commission, [1987] ECR 4487.
144. Which was disallowed in the infringement procedure in Cartonboard, see e.g. Case
T-317/94,Weig v. Commission, [1998] ECR II-1235, para 172 (fine reduced on appeal, Case
C-280/98 P, Weig v. Commission, [2000] ECR I-9757).
145. Temple Lang, op. cit. supra note 4, p. 142.
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after Alrosa, with very little supervision from the Court –, the Commission
lacks the incentive to press for legal change that would define the
requirements for and bounds of such remedies.
8. Conclusions
The trend towardsmore “consensual competition law” is worrying, despite the
benefits the negotiated solutions undoubtedly have. The main danger is that a
level of “quasi-law in action” develops, uncontrolled by the courts and only
tentatively guided by the law in the books.146A body of commitment decisions
supplemented by equally non-authoritative guidelines by the Commission
under a regime of self-assessment and in the times of an effects-based
approach is perhaps not the environment most conducive to legal certainty.
This likely leads into a vicious circle: where the legal principles are not clearly
defined, but can only be extrapolated from non-authoritative guidance, there is
less certainty as to the threat points in the bargaining process, which makes it
more likely that parties opt for negotiated solutions; and negotiated solutions
without a clear ex ante definition of the parties’ “property rights” become
increasingly messy with each iteration. It does not help that from the
Commission’s viewpoint this development is not necessarily unwelcome,
because it increases the Commission’s power in setting discretionary
remedies.147
One slightly unconventional way of addressing this would be to reduce the
Commission’s relative incentive to opt for the commitment procedure, not by
making the commitment procedure less attractive by imposing constraints, but
by making the infringement procedure more attractive by allowing the
Commission to adopt remedies in the infringement procedure that go beyond
the merely backward looking termination of the infringement.148 To date, the
Courts have reacted in a hostile manner to any attempts by the Commission to
146. Pointedly Waelbroeck, op. cit. supra note 68, 3: “politique parallèle . . . qui échappe
entièrement au contrôle du juge “; Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, 227–228, identified this danger
from the very start, referring, inter alia, to the Commission’s announcement in press release
IP/06/495 of 12 Apr. 2006, stating that Repsol’s commitments were a “benchmark for the few
other competitors who still maintain similar practices”; see also Forrester, op. cit. supra note
123, p. 638, and his contribution to the discussion of PanelV in Ehlermann andMarquis, op. cit.
supra note 1, p. 540; Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 648. Rab, Monnoyeur and Sukhtankar,
op. cit. supra note 3, 175, consider this to be an advantage for undertakings (“Approved
commitments may also serve as guidance for the undertaking concerned and others “); this
seems a rather myopic view.
147. Cf. Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5, pp. 648–649; Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 4, p.
559.
148. Cf. Lianos, op. cit. supra note 9. See also Rab, Monnoyeur and Sukhtankar, op. cit.
supra note 3, 175 (noting that part of the attraction of the commitment procedure for the
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take a proactive stance in devising remedies.149 At first sight, this restrictive
stance may seem to decrease the Commission’s discretion and increase legal
certainty. But such an assessment leaves out of the equation that the
Commission can opt out of the infringement procedure altogether, and is more
likely to do so where the range of available remedies in the commitment
procedure is substantially greater than that in the infringement procedure.The
Commission’s discretion in devising more “creative” remedies in the
infringement procedure would still be subject to Court control, whereas
Alrosa has practically eliminated all such control in the commitment
procedure.
The alternative to making the infringement procedure more attractive is to
subject the Commission to constraints in the commitment procedure. Neither
the EU legislature nor the Courts appear willing to take on this task.While the
Commission seems willing to exercise self-restraint in each individual case, it
shows no willingness to adopt any self-binding instruments.
The EU legislature chose not to implement any ex ante mandatory court
supervision of commitment agreements. This defect has often – and rightly –
been criticized and contrasted to the U.S.TunneyAct.150 Even though the U.S.
procedure may often not be much more than a rubber-stamping of the
negotiated solution,151 it may well have a disciplining effect on the
negotiations and the transparency of the procedure. The possibility of
appealing commitment decisions in Europe is a very deficient substitute for an
ex ante supervision. First, there will usually be no appellant, because the
addressees have no interest in – and possibly not even the opportunity of –
appealing the decision, third parties will not necessarily have locus standi,152
and the public interest in the process of competition does not have an effective
representative to begin with.153 Secondly, even to the extent the decision is
appealed, the appellant will not often be able to overcome the judicial
deference to the Commission’s assessment, especially where the appellant is
the addressee that had voluntarily offered the commitments.
The Court of Justice had the opportunity in Alrosa to provide for an
effective proportionality review at least in those few cases that are appealed.
Commission is the advantage of commitments over the “less precise outcome in the
infringement decision and a ‘cease and desist’ order”) and 181.
149. Cf. e.g, the Cartonboard case, cited supra note 144.
150. The fullest comparison is made byGeorgiev, op. cit. supra note 3, 1007 et seq.; see also
Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5, pp. 651–652, 658; Cook, op. cit. supra note 2, 210.
151. Georgiev, ibid.
152. Immenga, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 302. Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5, p. 653,
discusses whether the ECJ’s statement that the Commission has to take into consideration the
interests of third parties could be interpreted as demanding a wide understanding of the locus
standi requirement.
153. Schweitzer, op. cit. supra note 5, pp. 656–658.
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The ECJ has chosen to forgo this opportunity. Concededly, even the strict
approach of the General Court would probably not have made a great
difference in terms of actual challenges: the constellation of a third-party
appellant with clear locus standi was exceptional, and the parties that have
agreed themselves to the commitments – however grudgingly – are de facto
not likely to seek judicial review and risk the Commission’s adopting an
infringement decision.154 Yet, again, the mere possibility of a meaningful ex
post proportionality review might have had a disciplining effect on the
negotiations ex ante. The General Court’s approach would arguably not only
have improved the probability that the remedies are proportionate: the
approach would have forced the Commission to explain the theory of harm as
a definition of the objective to be pursued, and to explain how the remedies
further this objective. This burden of explanation, the resulting need for
investigating the facts and the relation of the remedies to the theory of harm,
and the reduction of the attractiveness of the commitment procedure relative
to the infringement procedure, would have prodded the Commission to give
deeper thought to the adequacy of the commitments as well.
The parties could under the ECJ’s Alrosa decision still try to coax a
proportionality analysis from the Commission by submitting not one set of
commitments, but a range of incremental commitments (“salami tactic”). It is
impossible to tell how the Commission would react to such a tactic. Even if it
worked, the facts remain that the undertakings that have successfully obtained
a commitment decision are unlikely to challenge it,155 and that third parties
cannot employ the salami tactic, because they cannot usually offer alternative
commitments for the undertakings concerned.
Nor does the Commission seem willing to exercise self-restraint by
adopting self-binding guidelines on the case selection for commitment
procedures and/or the standard for the reasoning to be employed in
commitment decisions.156 It would already help if, in its commitment
decisions, the Commission set out in abstract terms, but in detail, which legal
theories of harms it is pursuing as a major premise, what legal precedent
supports these theories of harm and how the remedies chosen relate to these
theories of harm – why they are deemed adequate, necessary and
proportionate.157 Where the Commission is not able to support the stated
154. See supra note 114.
155. Ibid.
156. See supra note 10.
157. Of course, the commitment decisions already set out the “practices raising concerns”,
and since the GC’s judgment in Alrosa, contain a section on proportionality. However, these
sections not infrequently commingle facts and law, and are often cursory. For a similar call for
an extended proportionality analysis that is challengeable before the Court under a less
deferential standard of review, see Cengiz, op. cit. supra note 5, 129 and 152.
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theories of harm with precedent, this indicates that a novel legal issue is
involved, and the Commission should refrain from using the commitment
procedure altogether. If the stated theory of harm in itself is erroneous as a
matter of law,158 the decision should be challengeable even in the absence of
amanifest error.Themanifest error standard should only apply to the complex
economic assessment that is involved in subsuming the – preliminarily
assessed – facts under the major premise; there is no reason to apply the
deferential standard to the framing of the major premise. The current practice
of intermingling the theory of harm (the major premise) with the assessment
of the facts (the minor premise and conclusion) in the section on “practices
raising concerns” in commitment decisions leads to an unjustified extension
of the deferential standard to pure questions of law.
It is equally important to clarify the limitations that commitment decisions
have on actions by NCAs and private parties. Recitals 13 and 22 of Regulation
1/2003 produce only apparent clarity in this regard. The ostensibly unaffected
opportunities for control by NCAs and private plaintiffs result in the
misleading assumption that commitment decisions are little more than a
qualified closing of the file.De facto, however, it appears unlikely that private
enforcement and enforcement by NCAs will act as a sufficient check on
infringements that escape the Commission’s attention in the commitment
procedure; and where it is the commitments themselves that have
anticompetitive effects, this safety valve does not even exist de iure. The
practical effect of a commitment decision is therefore more akin to a negative
clearance or an individual exemption under the notification system than to a
closing of the file, because third-party actions are largely forestalled by the
commitment procedure. The Commission should realize the responsibility
that comeswith this de factomonopoly, a responsibility that is obscured by the
misleading pronouncements in Recitals 13 and 22.
This article is not necessarily meant to be a criticism of the Commission’s
actual practice in commitment decisions issued to date. The Commission
often does investigate to the point of issuing a Statement of Objections instead
of confining itself to a preliminary assessment. Its reasoning is often
158. Mische and Visnar, op. cit. supra note 5, 20, point out that the ECJ in Alrosa never
reached the question whether the GC was right in assuming that ad hoc voluntary purchases by
the dominant undertaking did not constitute an infringement of Art. 102 TFEU. I share the
A.G.’s view that the GC’s statements in this regard were not well founded, as they ignored that
the dominant undertaking may be willing to pay a premium that reflects the unilateral effects of
the foreclosure, so that voluntary ad hoc purchases may well be infringements of Art. 102
TFEU. The ECJ’s silence could be interpreted as implying, however, that a commitment
decision could be based on a theory of harm that is erroneous as a matter of law, provided only
that the undertaking offers commitments; this would be worrying and unnecessary for ensuring
the institutional effectiveness of commitment decisions.
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elaborate. The fact remains, however, that the institutional set-up does not
ensure the continued high quality of commitment decisions.While trust in the
Commission’s self-restraint in each individual case is good, providing for a
system of control is usually better when devising an institutional framework.
Such a framework should guarantee that we do not substitute unprincipled
case-to-case negotiations for the struggle for the rule of law.
CML Rev. 2012970 Wagner-Von Papp
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